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Although many in the national and international legal community
did not take notice of class arbitration until the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle in 2003,' class
arbitration (also known as "class action arbitration") has actually been in
existence for over twenty-five years.2 First developed in the United
States in the early 1980s, 3 the procedure has also been considered as a
domestic dispute resolution device in other countries
The most recent development in the field is the internationalization
of class arbitration, as demonstrated by the filing of several different
types of cross-border proceedings.' Furthermore, it is anticipated that the
frequency of international class arbitration will only increase as the
global economy continues to expand and diversify, and as claimants who
may not reside in the same country as the defendant seek to assert group
or representative claims that are barred from judicial consideration by
arbitration agreements. In coming years, international class arbitration is
1. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
2. Class arbitration involves "an arbitrator [or arbitral tribunal] selected and paid by
the parties, rather than an elected or appointed judge, [who] presides over a class action" and
thus "decides whether to certify a class, determines the form and manner of notice to class
members, resolves all issues of law and fact, and enters an award that may bind many hun-
dreds or thousands of class members." W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the
Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 70 (2007). Many international arbitrations con-
sist of a panel of three arbitrators. However, for ease of discussion, this Article refers to the
arbitrator in the singular.
3. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Jean R. Stemlight, As Man-
datory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 39 (2000).
4. See infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
6. Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 Nw.
J. INT'L L. Bus. 301, 301 (2007); see also Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Para-
digm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENY. U. L. REV.
301, 301 (2004) (describing areas where class arbitration might be on the rise) [hereinafter
Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm]; Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of Interna-
tional Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 250-55 (2006) (describing
areas where international arbitration is likely to increase) [hereinafter Drahozal, New Experi-
ences]; Edward F Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and
Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 407 (2002) (describing areas
where class arbitration might be on the rise); Anne Marie Whitesell & Eduardo Silva-Romero,
Multiparty and Multicontract Arbitration: Recent ICC Experience, in ICC INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS-SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 2003,
at 7, 7 (2003) (describing increase in multi-party proceedings).
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expected to encompass a variety of fields, including insurance, finance,
manufacturing, consumer, maritime, employment, and electronic com-
merce law, since the nature of the claims asserted in class arbitration
mirror the diversity of claims that are seen in judicial class actions .
The expansion of class arbitration into the international realm has
not gone unchallenged. Instead, international defendants have already
shown signs of their intent to fight tooth and nail against the develop-
ment of international class arbitration,8 just as their U.S. counterparts did
in the early days of domestic class arbitration. Many of the defenses to
international class arbitration are the same as those used in domestic
matters, and arbitrators are able to rely on a large and growing body of
existing jurisprudence when considering those issues.9 However, the
cross-border nature of international class arbitration gives rise to unique
challenges, many of which have not yet been considered in the litera-
ture.'0
For reasons that will be discussed more fully below, it is anticipated
that (1) most international class arbitrations will be seated in the United
States, at least for the foreseeable future, and (2) vigorous opposition to
7. See Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 301 (discussing areas of law
where class actions and class arbitrations are common); Drahozal, New Experiences, supra
note 6, at 250-55 (describing international elements of consumer, employment, and e-
commerce law); Geraint Howells & Rhoda James, Litigation in the Consumer Interest, 9 ILSA
J. INT'L & ComP. L. 1, 48-55 (2002) (discussing globalization of consumer actions);
Sherman, supra note 6, at 407 (discussing areas where class actions are likely). Of course, the
consensual aspect of arbitration typically requires some sort of pre-existing contractual rela-
tionship between the parties.
8. See, e.g., Harvard Coll. v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, No. 04-6069, 2007 WL 3019234
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007) (confirming international class arbitration award): The President and
Fellows of Harvard College Against JSC Surgutneftegaz, 770 PLI/LIT 127, 155 (2008) [here-
inafter Harvard Award] (reproducing the partial final award on clause construction of a
possible international class arbitration and noting defendants' claim that class arbitration was a
"'uniquely American' device").
9. For example, unconscionability, waiver, and contract-based defenses such as fraud
and duress, will likely be raised to the same extent in international class arbitration as they are
in domestic class arbitration. See Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration,
15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 199, 201 (2004) (discussing ability of waiver clauses to withstand
contract-based challenges); Stemlight, supra note 3, at 45-53, 105-08; Jean R. Sternlight &
Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Busi-
ness Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 75-76 (2004)
(discussing attempts by corporations to avoid class proceedings through contractual prohibi-
tions); Weidemaier, supra note 2, at 85, 90, 100 (2007) (discussing prohibition of class
arbitrations). These issues are outside the scope of this Article.
10. Known publications on this subject are limited to Alexander Blumrosen, The Glob-
alization of American Class Actions: International Enforcement of Class Action Arbitral
Awards, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CONSENT, PROCE-
DURE AND ENFORCEMENT 355, 355-73 (Belinda Macmahon ed., 2009); see also S.I. Strong,
Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Con-
cerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
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international class arbitration will arise at the international enforcement
stage." The battle will be fought particularly fiercely in cases where the
arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous about the possibility of class
treatment, with losing defendants arguing that the decision to proceed as
a class was presumptively improper in the absence of the parties' explicit
agreement to that particular type of procedure.'2
This sort of challenge will most likely be asserted as a procedural
objection under Article V(1)(d) of the United Nations' 1958 Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New
York Convention),' 3 and it is precisely these sort of arguments that will
be the focus of this Article. Although the New York Convention is not in
force in every jurisdiction, it is the most widely ratified international in-
strument of its type and demonstrates the kinds of challenges to
enforcement that might be made under other international instruments."
This Article contends that enforcing courts should consider objections
made under Article V(1)(d) in the same light as objections made in cases
11. See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text. This is not to say that international
defendants will not mount intermediary challenges whenever possible or that settlement of
cases will not be likely.
12. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5-03 to 5-10, 6-01 (4th ed. 2004). International commentators
have long considered the problem of "pathological clauses" that contain structural defects that
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the clause to fulfill one of its four essential functions.
See Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological Clauses: Frddkric Eisemann's Still Vital Criteria, 7 ARB.
INT'L 365, 365-66 (1991). According to the originator of the term, Frfddric Eisemann, one of
the four essential features of an arbitration clause "is to permit the putting in place of a proce-
dure leading under the best conditions of efficiency and rapidity to the rendering of an award
that is susceptible of judicial enforcement." Id. (translating Eisemann from the French). This
precept would appear to include questions of whether class arbitration is procedurally proper.
13. See, e.g., Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. V(l)(d), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York
Convention] (stating that "[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the
request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: ... (d) The composi-
tion of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the
country where the arbitration took place").
14. With over 140 States Parties, the New York Convention is one of the most "success-
ful commercial treaties in history." William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations
and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 251,
257 (2006); see also U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: 1958 Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (2008),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/NYConvention-status.html (last
visited June 24, 2009) (listing signatories to the New York Convention). Other international
enforcement mechanisms that are similar in many ways to the New York Convention are the
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S.
364 [hereinafter European Convention], and the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42 [hereinafter Panama
Convention].
involving non-class awards, effectively giving international class awards
the same presumption of enforceability that is granted to bilateral awards
under the New York Convention.'5 Although legitimate objections based
on violations of agreed procedure should be permitted, courts should not
entertain blanket objections to class arbitration based on the parties' hos-
tility to or unfamiliarity with class procedures. Instead, objections to the
enforcement of international class awards should be considered on an
individualized, case-by-case basis, using the same pro-arbitration per-
spective that is adopted when considering bilateral awards. This Article
demonstrates that this presumption is proper even in cases where the
arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment.
Before outlining the structure of this Article, it is useful to clarify
two matters regarding definitions and scope. First, in the context of this
Article, an "international class award" is an award resulting from an in-
ternational class arbitration.' 6 There are three different types of
international class arbitrations:
(1) a class arbitration that includes at least one defendant from a
country other than the seat of the arbitration, which means that
enforcement of an award will have international implications;
(2) a class arbitration that involves defendants that may be based
in the arbitral forum but that also hold significant foreign as-
sets that could be the subject of an international enforcement
action; and
(3) a class arbitration that includes claimants from outside the
arbitral seat. 7
15. GARY A. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5 (2001).
16. "International class arbitrations" can be defined in either of two ways: (1) as class
arbitrations giving rise to arbitral awards that are made "in the territory of a State other than
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards" are sought or (2) as class
arbitrations giving rise to arbitral awards "not considered as domestic awards in the State
where their recognition and enforcement are sought." New York Convention, supra note 13,
art. I(1). The latter category of arbitrations typically includes disputes involving parties from
different States or involving some important nexus with a foreign State. See, e.g., Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1970) (stating that "a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the [New York] Con-
vention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or
enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.").
17. Examples of each of these types of scenarios can already be found on the class
arbitration docket published by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). See Harvard
Coll. v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, Case No. 11 168 T 01654 04 (AAA, Aug. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5032; CBR Enter., L.L.C. v. Blimpie Int'l, Inc. (AAA, Apr. 19,
2006), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3929; Bagpeddler.com v. U.S. Bancorp, Case
No. 11 181 0032204 (AAA, May 4, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4667;
see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l. Corp., 548 F3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
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This Article focuses on the enforcement of awards resulting from the
first two types of proceedings, since defendants in both scenarios are
likely to raise similar arguments at the enforcement stage.18
Second, this Article focuses exclusively on enforcement issues rather
than considering challenges to a class award in both enforcement and
set-aside proceedings. 9 This approach was adopted because evidence
suggests that most (although not necessarily all) international class arbi-
trations are currently seated in the United States.20 Typically, a motion to
set aside an award would be made at the seat of the arbitration. However,
because the United States has already judicially approved of the class
arbitration mechanism, losing defendants will not be able to argue that
granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (upholding arbitral panel's decision that silent charter
agreements did not preclude class arbitration); Harvard Coll. v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, 2007 WL
3019234 (confirming international class arbitration award); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations
Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F3d 355, 362 n.31 (5th Cir. 2003) (concerning potential international
class arbitration). In the realm of international investment arbitration, 195,000 Italian natural
persons and juridical entities filed for arbitration against Argentina in Giovanna A. Beccara
and others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5), TRANSN'L Disp. MGMT. NEWS
DIG., May 10, 2007, http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news/tdmnews-
2007-08.htm [hereinafter Beccara Arbitration]. This Article went to press just after the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548
F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009). That decision may give fur-
ther guidance regarding the interpretation of arbitration agreements that are silent or
ambiguous as to class treatment.
18. The third type of proceeding is somewhat unique. Claimants to a class proceeding
are unlikely to lodge blanket objections to the type of procedure used, since (1) they were the
ones who chose class treatment in the first place and (2) claimants who prefer not to proceed
as part of a class can typically opt out of the arbitration. See infra note 185 and accompanying
text. Although some losing defendants might make certain objections based on the interna-
tional nature of the claimant class (essentially echoing arguments that international claimants
might make on their own behalf if they were to lose the case), those arguments are highly
speculative and beyond the scope of this discussion. For further discussion of what those ar-
guments might be, see Strong, supra note 10, at 90.
19. A dual-pronged approach might seem to make sense in the context of procedural
objections, which typically can be made in both enforcement and set-aside proceedings under
the same governing law. See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d); FAA, 9
U.S.C. § 10; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION arts.
34-36, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 18th Sess., Annex 1, U.N.
Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), revised by REVISED ARTICLES OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION arts. 34-36, UNCITRAL, 39th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW].
20. Though arbitration is normally a private event, which would make any estimates
about arbitral seats speculative, the AAA makes its class arbitration docket publicly available
through an online database. AAA Class Arbitration Docket, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?
id=25562 (last visited June 24, 2009); see also William K. Slate & Eric P. Tuchmann, Class
Action Arbitrations, 11 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 50, 53 (2008) (discussing empirical data on AAA
class arbitrations). The AAA docket contains each dispute's demand for arbitration, which
indicates the arbitral seat. To date, it appears that most class arbitrations on the AAA docket
are seated in the United States. However, global statements about arbitral seats cannot be
made, since ad hoc arbitrations are not reflected on the AAA docket and may not be men-
tioned in the legal press.
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class arbitrations are or should be presumptively disfavored as a matter
of international law or policy as part of a set-aside proceeding in the
United States." Thus, defendants may instead prefer to bring their chal-
lenges at the enforcement stage, when they believe that they may be able
to take advantage of any judicial hostility to class arbitration, either as a
result of the enforcing courts' viewing international enforcement pro-
ceedings as analogous to litigation brought under state law2 or applying
their own national law to procedural questions. 2 These sorts of judicial
improprieties may be particularly likely to occur with international class
arbitration, since its unique nature as a representative procedure 1 may
cause deep-seated concern or even hostility in jurisdictions that do not
permit representative proceedings in their national courts.25 However,
21. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion);
Stolt-Nielsen, 548 E3d at 100, cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009); Employers Ins. Co. of
Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443 F.3d 573, 576-81 (7th Cir. 2006); Pedcor, 343 F.3d at
363.
22. This approach is disfavored. See, e.g., Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation
S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., [1999] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 222, 224-25 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (noting, when ruling
to enforce an award based on a contract that would be unenforceable in English courts under
English law, that "the reason for the different result is that Swiss law is different from English
law, and the parties chose Swiss law and Swiss arbitration. If anything, this consideration
dictates (as a matter of policy of the upholding of international arbitral awards) that the award
should be enforced.").
23. This could occur even if the objection is brought under Article V(1)(d) of the New
York Convention, which does not permit the invocation of the enforcing court's law absent the
agreement of the parties. Compare New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d), with id.
art. V(2)(a)-(b) (referring to "the law of that country," meaning the enforcing State). However,
experience shows that some enforcing courts will try to impose their own values on questions
of arbitral procedure, regardless of the precepts of the New York Convention, typically by
elevating a procedural objection, explicitly or implicitly, to a public policy objection. Rosso e
Nero GaststattenbetriebsgmbH v. Almendrera Industrial Catalana, S.A. (Austria v. Spain), 32
Y.B. COM. ARB. 597, 599 (Trib. Sup. 2007); Precious Stones Shipping Ltd. v. Querqus Alimen-
taria, SL (Thail. v. Spain), 32 Y.B. COM. ARB. 540, 546 (Trib. Sup. 2007).
24. Carolyn B. Lamm & Jocelyn A. Aqua, Defining the Party--Who Is a Proper Party
in an International Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association and Other Inter-
national Institutions?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 711, 715 (2003); Weidemaier, supra note
2, at 70.
25. Although representative proceedings are permitted in some jurisdictions, they are
highly disfavored in much of the world. Baumgartner, supra note 6, at 308-09 (discussing
class or representative proceedings in a variety of common law systems); Richard B. Cappalli
& Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 217, 264 (1992) (noting U.S. class actions are legally "inconceivable" in
the civilian mindset); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Coun-
tries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 312-13 (2003) (noting that although class or representative
proceedings are generally disfavored in civil law jurisdictions, both Quebec and Brazil have
adopted types of class action litigation); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation
Across the Atlantic and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19
(2009) ("In broad-brush terms, the United States and Europe have grown more similar rather
than less as to aggregate litigation. Still, U.S.-style class actions and the constellation of rules
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this Article will show that class proceedings are an acceptable form of
arbitration under the New York Convention, despite their apparent nov-
elty, and that they are deserving of the same treatment given to other
types of arbitration.
Having considered these preliminary issues, it is useful to outline the
structure of this Article. The Article's overall aim is to determine the in-
ternational enforceability of international class awards in cases in which
the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment.
Part I therefore describes the current consensus on class arbitration in the
United States to lay the groundwork for further discussion. This Part also
describes the incidence of class arbitration in other domestic contexts,
showing that class arbitration is not as "uniquely American" as oppo-
nents have claimed.26 Part I continues with an overview of international
class arbitration to date and identifies the likelihood of international
class arbitration's expansion in the future.
Part II sharpens the debate about the propriety of class arbitration
with a pointed discussion of the objections that have and will be made to
this particular dispute resolution device. First, this Part outlines how
those who are opposed to international class arbitration prefer to inter-
pret arbitration agreements that are silent or ambiguous as to class
treatment, concluding that most opponents rely on strict construction of
the arbitration agreement, i.e., a view that class arbitration is improper in
the absence of explicit agreement to such proceedings. The Part contin-
ues with a discussion of the extent to which class arbitration can be
considered analogous to non-consensual consolidated arbitration, since
opponents to class arbitration are likely to claim that consolidation's dis-
favored status in the international realm should be extended to class
arbitration as well. In considering the merits of this view, the text out-
lines the structural differences between the two procedures as well as
their differing policy rationales before concluding that class arbitration is
supported by several persuasive public policies that do not apply to con-
solidated arbitration. Although these public policy rationales do not, by
themselves, justify a presumption in favor of permitting class arbitration
when the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to class treat-
ment, they do suggest that strict constructionism may not be the best
response to the challenges associated with class proceedings in arbitra-
tion.
and practices within which they operate remain significantly different from the face of aggre-
gate litigation in Europe today.").
26. Harvard Award, supra note 8, at 155 (reproducing the partial final award on clause
construction of a possible international class arbitration and noting defendants' claim that
class arbitration was a "'uniquely American' device").
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Whereas Part II focuses primarily on policy issues, Part III focuses
on principles of law. In particular, Part III responds directly to the views
asserted by opponents to class arbitration by demonstrating that (1) reli-
ance on analogies to consolidation is inapt because these analogies are
based on legal principles that are no longer in force and (2) strict con-
structionism utilizes an unnecessarily restrictive reading of the doctrine
of consent. This Part also evaluates the extent to which interpretive
methods used by U.S. arbitrators to construe an arbitration agreement
that is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment measure up to interna-
tionally accepted standards regarding contract interpretation. As it turns
out, the interpretive method currently used in U.S. class arbitrations con-
forms to international arbitral practice and is entirely appropriate to a
dispute resolution mechanism founded on consent and party autonomy.
Once the propriety of international class arbitration has been estab-
lished as a matter of international law and policy, the discussion turns in
Part IV to how U.S.-based class arbitrations should fare in international
enforcement proceedings. In particular, this Part contemplates specific
objections that might be made under Article V(1)(d) of the New York
Convention to a class award rendered in the United States under an arbi-
tration agreement that was silent or ambiguous as to class treatment and
suggests how courts asked to enforce such an award should view those
objections.27
The Article's conclusion draws together the diverse strands of law
and policy and demonstrates why class awards arising out of arbitration
agreements that are silent or ambiguous as to class treatment can and
should be granted the same presumption of enforceability as is given to
bilateral awards under the New York Convention.2 This section also sets
class arbitration in the context of other multi-party proceedings, confirm-
ing that the development of international class arbitration is consistent
with similar trends in other areas of international commercial arbitration.
I. CLASS ARBITRATIONS-PRESENT AND FUTURE
A. Current Consensus on Class Arbitration in the United States
Since its first appearance in the United States more than twenty-five
years ago, class arbitration has matured greatly.29 Not only has the pro-
cedure been standardized to some extent through the creation of several
27. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d).
28. BORN, supra note 15, at 5.
29. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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sets of specialized arbitral rules, 0 but the balance between judicial and
arbitral authority has been stabilized after an initial period of confusion
and contradiction. These two developments will assist in the recognition
of class arbitration as an internationally viable dispute resolution mecha-
nism. Each will be discussed in turn below.
1. Balancing Judicial and Arbitral Authority
For purposes of this Article, the most important legal development in
recent years is the U.S. judicial recognition that arbitrators, rather than
courts, are the ones to decide whether class arbitration is permitted in
situations where the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous regard-
ing the possibility of class treatment.3 Justice Stephen Breyer, writing
for a plurality of the United States Supreme Court in Bazzle, reasoned
that because the question relates to "what kind of arbitration proceeding
the parties agreed to"-i.e., the procedure to be followed-rather than
"the validity of the arbitration clause ... []or its applicability," the issue
can and should be addressed by the arbitrator, unless the arbitration
agreement clearly requires these jurisdictional questions to be decided
by a judge, an approach that has subsequently been adopted by various
federal circuit courts. 2
This shift in approach is important to the international enforceability
of class awards because it eliminates one of the primary objections to the
legitimacy of class arbitration. For many years, courts were the ones who
decided whether class treatment was appropriate in the United States.33
During that period, opponents to class arbitration argued that courts
lacked the power "to certify an individual plaintiff as a class representa-
30. AAA, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited June 24, 2009) [hereinafter AAA SUPPLE-
MENTARY RULES]; JAMS, JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2009), http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules/class-action.asp (last visited June 24, 2009) [hereinafter JAMS CLASS
ARBITRATION RULES]; NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
(2007), http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/Arbitration%20Class%20Procedures%
202007.pdf (last visited June 24, 2009) [hereinafter NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES];
Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 186, 225-55 (2006)
[hereinafter Buckner, Due Process]; Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitu-
tional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1768-78 (2006).
31. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003) (plurality opinion);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009); Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443 F.3d
573, 576-81 (7th Cir. 2006); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d
355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
32. See, e.g., Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453 (noting that the question "concerns contract inter-
pretation and arbitration procedures" and that "arbitrators are well situated" to address those
issues); Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 100, cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009); Employers,
443 F.3d at 576-81; Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 363.
33. Buckner, Due Process, supra note 30, at 227-31.
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tive for other parties whose claims are subject to arbitration, lack[ed]
express authority to consolidate arbitration proceedings, and lack[ed]
authority to apply Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
class arbitration. 34 Part of the strength of this argument lay in the fact
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)35 and many state statutes were
either silent on the issue of court-ordered consolidation or indicated that
consolidation of arbitrations was only possible with the unanimous con-
36
sent of the parties.
Although the "lack of power" debate has been largely mooted as a
matter of U.S. law, it should not be allowed to insert itself in the interna-
tional sphere for two reasons. First, the argument was largely based on
the fact that many U.S. states did not permit consolidation of arbitrations
over the objection of the parties.37 Although mandatory consolidation is
by no means the norm in the United States, a number of state legislatures
have revised their arbitration laws to make consolidation easier in cases
where the arbitration agreement is silent, often through adoption of the
liberal consolidation provisions of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
2000 (RUAA).38 Furthermore, the leading case prohibiting the non-
consensual consolidation of arbitrations-the Seventh Circuit's holding
in Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.39 -has since been discredited, with the
Second Circuit recently noting that Champ does "not represent a
governing rule of contract interpretation" in all cases, nor is it "adhered
to in every jurisdiction., 40 This liberalizing trend in favor of multi-party
arbitration-which mirrors a similar movement outside the United
States 4-should minimize a number of concerns the international arbi-
tral community may have about class arbitration.
Second, the "lack of power" debate reflected an unwarranted as-
sumption that consolidated arbitrations were analogous in all relevant
respects to class arbitrations. Although there are some similarities in
policy and procedure, the two actions are not identical, and courts and
34. Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 312. Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure describes the criteria that must be met before a judicial class action
can proceed and how such actions can proceed. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
35. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2002).
36. Id.; Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 312-13 (citing Champ v.
Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995)).
37. Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 312-13.
38. See infra notes 227-234 and accompanying text (noting twelve adherents to the
RUAA and two U.S. jurisdictions that have gone even further).
39. Champ, 55 E3d 269.
40. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454-55 (2003) (Stephens, J., con-
curring); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F3d 85, 100-01 n.15 (2d Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (claiming Champ is merely "instructive" re-
garding party intent).
41. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
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commentators should be very cautious about equating the two in all re-
spects and without a full understanding of the differences between the
two types of proceedings.42
Third, there is no corresponding "lack of power" argument to be
made if arbitrators are given the authority to construe silent or ambigu-
ous arbitration agreements. The current approach used in the United
States conforms with several basic principles of arbitration law. For ex-
ample, arbitrators are considered competent to determine their own
jurisdiction, both as a matter of U.S. and international practice, so their
doing so in class arbitrations should create no novel questions of law.43
Similarly, it is universally agreed that arbitrators have wide discretion to
shape arbitral proceedings, subject only to the expressed and permissible
wishes of the parties." This is no less true in class arbitrations, although
there has been some debate about the level of creativity that arbitrators
42. See infra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
43. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); Bernard Hanotiau,
Groups of Companies in International Arbitration, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION 279, 292 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Hanotiau, Groups of Companies]; Stephen Jagusch & Anthony Sinclair, The Im-
pact of Third Parties on International Arbitration-Issues of Assignment, in PERVASIVE
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra, at 291, 292. An interesting question is to
what extent different States interpret the concept of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e., the ability of
an arbitrator to decide his or her own jurisdiction over a dispute. See William W. Park, The
Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has
Crossed the Atlantic, 12 ARB. INT'L 137, 153-54 (1996) [hereinafter Park, Arbitrability Dicta]
(distinguishing between separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz); Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral
Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of 'Consent', 24 ARB. INT'L 199, 214 (2008).
44. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Petrambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, [2002] 364 A.R. 272, 36 (Can.) (noticing breadth of arbitrator discretion on matters
of procedure); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 1238 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter GAILLARD &
SAVAGE] (describing how arbitrator discretion arises); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARA-
TIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 21-3 (2003) (noting arbitral discretion to
decide procedure); INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 15
(1998), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4l99/index.html (last visited
June 30, 2009) [hereinafter ICC RULES]; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 16 (2008), available at http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=33994#INTERNATIONAL%20ARBITRATION%20RULES (last visited July 7,
2009) (formerly the AAA International Rules) [hereinafter ICDR INTERNATIONAL RULES];
LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION RULES R. 14 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.lcia.org/ARB-folder/arb-english_main.htm (last visited June 24, 2009)
[hereinafter LCIA RULES]; Swiss RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION art. 15 (2006),
available at https://www.sccam.org/sa/en/rules.php (last visited June 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Swiss RULES]; UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, G.A. Res. 31/98, § 15 (Apr. 28, 1975),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last
visited July 6, 2009). Nevertheless, some internationalists might question any improper "'ab-
dication' of the court's 'responsibility for determining the jurisdictional limits of arbitration
clauses."' Rau, supra note 43, at 253. However, courts can address this issue at the enforce-
ment stage. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(I)(c).
can and should utilize when adopting class procedures.4 ' However, so
long as "the procedure adopted by the tribunal conforms with the appli-
cable arbitration rules or with the law governing the arbitration there can
be no ground to refuse enforcement. 46 Furthermore:
In order for a breach of the agreement to lead to refusal of en-
forceability, the breach should be material, i.e., there is a de
minimis rule and insignificant deviations do not cause unen-
forceability. The right test of materiality could perhaps be
whether the breach could have had an effect on the outcome or
not rather than whether it did have an effect. 7
In most instances, it seems unlikely that a determination that class arbi-
tration is (or is not) proper would have an effect on the merits of the
adjudicated dispute, certainly not in the same way that a limitation on a
party's right to present evidence would be, for example.4'8 Therefore, any
arguments that arbitrators lack the inherent power to order class treat-
ment under an arbitration agreement that is silent or ambiguous on the
issue appear unavailing.
2. Developing Standardized Rule Sets
The second recent development in the United States-the promulga-
tion of specialized rule sets addressing class treatment 9 -also bodes
well for international enforcement of class awards. Although not every
class proceeding will necessarily be governed by one of these rule sets,
their existence has done much to legitimate class arbitration, particularly
given that no court in the U.S. has yet defined what procedures must be
followed once class arbitration is underway. Furthermore, because the
45. See Yuen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (noting
that "under ... Green Tree, the court decides whether the matter should be referred to arbitra-
tion, but 'once a matter has been referred to arbitration, the court's involvement is strictly
limited until the arbitration is completed"' (quoting Finley v. Saturn of Roseville, 117 Cal.
App. 4th 1253, 1259 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)); see also Weidemaier, supra note 2, at 94-95
(claiming the new class arbitration rules "fail to engage with the possibilities of class arbitra-
tion" and take an "impoverished view" of the procedure by not taking advantage of the
possibility of individually tailored procedures and remedies that are the hallmark of arbitra-
tion); Michael Pryles, Reflections on Transnational Public Policy, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 4 (2003)
(noting that "[a]rbitrators have an obligation to apply internationally accepted norms of proce-
dure").
46. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 26-97.
47. MATTI S. KURKELA & HANNES SNELLMAN, DUE PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 80-81 (2005).
48. At least one commentator has argued that class certification affects the likelihood of
settlement. Weston, supra note 30, at 1728. However, increasing the chance for settlement is
not the same as altering the outcome on the merits.
49. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30; JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 30; NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 30.
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published procedures are widely available and supported by reputable
arbitral institutions, there is less opportunity for defendants to claim that
a class proceeding is in some way so "alien" to the concept of arbitration
that a class award should not be enforceable.0 In light of these develop-
ments, defendants-including non-U.S. defendants--do not appear able
to claim surprise at how a class arbitration proceeds, particularly if the
procedure conforms to one of the published rule sets.'
B. Class Arbitration Outside the United States
Furthermore, class arbitration is not a "'uniquely American' device,"
despite recent claims to that end.52 In the last several years, domestic
class arbitration has been considered in countries other than the United
States, although the frequency of these types of proceedings is difficult
to ascertain due to the private nature of arbitration. It is also difficult to
identify what procedures were adopted in these arbitrations, both be-
cause of language barriers and because details about arbitral procedure
seldom make it into official reports absent some sort of challenge. How-
ever, to the extent that reports of such arbitrations are available, it is
useful to see how non-U.S. courts and/or arbitrators handle issues relat-
ing to the construction of the arbitration agreement, since the legitimacy
of the U.S. approach may be increased if U.S. procedures mirror those of
other nations.
As the following discussion demonstrates, non-U.S. class arbitra-
tions resemble U.S. class arbitrations in several significant ways, even
though the non-U.S. class arbitrations do not base themselves-
explicitly or implicitly-on U.S. norms. This supports the view that U.S.
50. See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 283
(1989) (noting that parties can expressly agree on a procedure, but that recognition of an
award resulting from those procedures might be withheld if "the term was so alien to English
concepts of the nature of an arbitration as to transform a process which the contract referred to
as arbitration... into something fundamentally different"). One commentator has noted that a
number of recent U.S. cases have imposed
arbitration with different procedural and substantive contours than is actually set
forth in the arbitration clause or clauses at issue.... It remains to be seen if this
reasoning extends into international arbitration, with the risks of imposing rules and
practices on foreign parties and arbitrators-particularly regarding class actions-
with which they have no or limited familiarity because those rules and practices are
unknown in their home countries.
Mark Friedman et al., InternationalArbitration, 41 INT'L L. 251, 256 (2007) (discussing Kris-
tian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (Ist Cir. 2006)); see also Kathleen M. Scanlon, Class
Arbitration Waivers: The "Severability" Doctrine and its Consequences, 62 Disp. RESOL. J.
40, 42-44 (2007) (discussing Kristian).
51. See infra notes 261-269 and accompanying text.
52. Harvard Award, supra note 8, at 155.
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class arbitrations conform with the fundamental principles of interna-
tional arbitration and suggests that U.S. class awards should be given the
same presumption of enforceability that is given to bilateral awards un-
der the New York Convention. Notably, courts and arbitrators
considering class arbitrations in non-U.S. contexts do not rely on U.S.
class procedure when considering the propriety of class treatment; in-
stead, the courts in the following cases relied on their own domestic
legislation on class or representative action."
There are several examples of non-U.S. courts considering class ar-
bitration. The first is Valencia v. Bancolombia, which involved a tribunal
based in Bogotd, Colombia, that was invited to hear a class suit initiated
by shareholders following the merger of two financial entities 4 Al-
though the claim was initially filed in court, both the civil circuit judge
and the District Superior Court held that they had no jurisdiction over
the matter, given the existence of an arbitration agreement in the bylaws
of one of the financial entities. 5' The plaintiffs argued that class actions
in Colombia are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, but the
Supreme Court of Justice rejected that argument on the grounds that the
arbitration agreement did not limit the types of claims that could be
submitted to arbitration and thus did not exclude class arbitrations as a
matter of law.56
This approach is similar to the one taken in the United States, in that
broadly drawn arbitration agreements are more likely to be construed to
53. For example, several Canadian provinces and territories have enacted statutes per-
mitting class or representative actions. Ontario Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992)
(Can.); British Columbia Class Proceedings Act, S.B.C., ch. 21 (1995) (Can.); Saskatchewan
Class Actions Act, S.S., ch. C-12.01 (2001) (Can.); Manitoba Class Proceedings Act, S.M., ch.
C- 130 (2002) (Can.); Newfoundland and Labrador Class Actions Act, S. Nfld. ch. 18.1 (2001)
(Can.); Alberta Class Proceedings Act, S.A., ch. G 16.5 (2003) (Can.); Quebec Code of Civil
Procedure, R.S.Q., ch. C-25, §§ 999-1051 (2009) (Can.). Canadian plaintiffs can also rely on
common law provisions regarding class or representative actions. W. Canadian Shopping Ctrs.
Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 201 D.L.R. 4th 385 (Can.); see Law Society Amendment Act (Class
Proceedings Funding), S.O., 1002 ch. 7 (1992) (Can.) (providing funding for class proceed-
ings). While language barriers have made it difficult to ascertain the content of Colombian
laws regarding class or representative suits, reports indicate that the Colombian bar takes an
activist, public interest approach to litigation that would permit the development of class or
representative actions. Philip M. Gentry, Overcoming Cultural Blindness in International
Clinical Cooperation: The Divide Between Civil and Common Law Cultures and its Implica-
tion for Clinical Education, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 131, 144, n.59 (2008). Certainly the
arguments in Valencia v. Bancolombia, which are discussed in more detail below, suggest the
existence of domestic Colombian legislation regarding class actions. Valencia v. Bancolombia
(Colom. v. Colom.), Zuleta DIGEST for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib.
Bogotd Chamber Comm. 2003), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com.
54. Valencia, supra note 53.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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allow class arbitration than narrowly drawn agreements are. 7 Further-
more, the Colombian Supreme Court held that arbitrators have the same
duties and powers as a court and thus have the competence to resolve
class claims, again echoing the approach adopted in the United States.5"
Although the Colombian Supreme Court appeared to limit its ruling to
shareholder actions where arbitration of disputes is contemplated by the
terms of the shareholder agreement, the court seemed to emphasize the
importance of the parties' expectations that their disputes would be arbi-
trated (in whatever manner) rather than litigated. 59 That, too, appears
consistent with the approach taken in the United States, which also rec-
ognizes the importance of considering party expectations regarding the
resolution of their disputes when interpreting arbitration agreements that
are silent or ambiguous regarding class treatment.60 In many ways, the
Colombian Supreme Court's decision seems to leave the door open for
the development of class arbitration in Colombia, even outside the
shareholder scheme.
Canada has also considered the possibility of class arbitration.6 ' For
example, Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. demonstrates how the unconscion-
ability defense can be raised in potential class arbitrations and considers
several important public policy arguments.62 In that case, the Ontario Su-
perior Court of Justice considered the argument that plaintiffs would be
dissuaded from proceeding in individual arbitrations due to the expense
of individual arbitration in relation to the prospective individual awards.63
Although the court found the argument unpersuasive given the lack of
evidence showing that plaintiffs in this matter had, in fact, been dis-
57. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
58. Valencia, supra note 53.
59. Id.
60. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. For more on shareholder arbitration, see
Perry Herzfeld, Prudent Anticipation? The Arbitration of Public Company Shareholder Dis-
putes, 24 ARB. INT'L 297 (2008).
61. In addition to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice's opinion in Kanitz v. Rogers
Cable Inc., [2002] 58 O.R.3d 299 (Can.), the Quebec Court of Appeal has noted that con-
sumer protection claims can, under some circumstances, be arbitrated. Dell Computer Corp. v.
Union des consommateurs, [2005] Q.C.C.A. 570, rev'd, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.) (stating
arbitration was improper in this instance because the arbitration clause was not properly
brought to the consumers' attention). Since Dell Computer involved a class action, it would
appear that the Quebec Court of Appeal was leaving the door open for a class arbitration. See
id. Notably, Quebec-like Colombia-is a civil law jurisdiction, which negates any arguments
that class arbitration is a uniquely common law device. See also Beccara Arbitration, supra
note 17 (involving a claimant class of at least 195,000 Italian bondholders, again demonstrat-
ing that class arbitration extends to civil law jurisdictions). For more on Canadian class
actions in the transnational context, see Joel P. Rochon, The Transnational Class: A Canadian
Perspective on Cross-Border Class Actions, I Assoc. TRIAL LAW. AM. ANN. CONV. REF. MAT.
453 passim (2006).
62. Kanitz, 58 O.R.3d 39.
63. Id.
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suaded from proceeding individually in arbitration, the analysis mirrors
that used by U.S. courts in similar circumstances. 4 The Ontario Superior
Court also considered whether giving effect to the arbitration/no class
action clause would defeat the public policies inherent in the Class Pro-
ceedings Act.6' Again, the court found the argument unpersuasive in
these circumstances, but the analytical approach is consistent with that
used in the United States, which also reviews public policies associated
with class proceedings when considering the propriety of a class arbitra-
tion.
The Ontario Superior Court did something else that is consistent
with U.S. practice, which is to give the decision on arbitral procedure to
the arbitrator. Invoking the consolidation provisions contained in section
20(1) of the Arbitration Act as well as potential efficiency concerns, the
court indicated:
Without deciding the point, it would appear that section 20(1)
would permit an arbitrator, at the very least, to consolidate a
number of arbitrations which raise the same issue. Therefore, it
appears at least arguable that if each of the five named represen-
tative plaintiffs here chose to seek arbitrations of their claims, an
arbitrator might well decide that those arbitrations could be
dealt with together thereby saving time and expense for all par-
ties. Such possibilities serve to militate against the central
assertion of the plaintiffs that the arbitration clause operates so
as to erect an economic wall barring customers of the defendant
from effectively seeking relief.
66
Thus, the Canadian courts appear to share the view taken by U.S. courts
that the arbitrator is the one to decide whether class treatment is required
or permitted.
Kanitz provides other useful insights. For example, the language
excerpted above demonstrates that Canadian courts-like U.S. courts-
tend to rely on analogies to consolidation and legislation concerning
consolidation when considering the propriety of class arbitration.
Canadian courts also take principles of efficiency into account, although
those are not the only concerns when deciding whether class treatment is
64. Id. 42.
65. Id. 51.
66. Id. 1$ 54-55 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Ontario Arbitration Act 1991
appears to permit consolidation of arbitrations with the consent of all parties. Ontario Arbitra-
tion Act, S.O. 1991, ch. 17, § 8(4). However, the Ontario Superior Court referred to section
20(1), which gives a general grant to the arbitrator to "determine the procedure to be followed
in the arbitration." Id. § 20(1). This raises the question of whether the Ontario Superior Court
considers class arbitration a procedural matter that does not require recourse to the courts via
section 8(4) of the Arbitration Act. At this point, the issue remains open.
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proper. Although class arbitration did not result in this instance, the
analysis is consistent in many ways with that taken in the United States
and thus suggests that U.S. class arbitrations are in conformity with pro-
cedures accepted elsewhere in the international arbitral community.
National courts are not the only bodies to have contemplated class
arbitration. Certain international tribunals have also considered the pos-
sibility of class treatment in arbitration. For example, a number of
claimants came to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 2003 seek-
ing to bring an action "on [their] own behalf and by proxy and
representation on behalf of all Iranian citizens. 67 However, the rules of
the Tribunal require claimants to "own" their claims, which means that
any representative action must fail, since the party bringing it does not
have the requisite degree of ownership.68 As the Tribunal stated,
"[b]ecause ownership of a claim is a sine qua non of a party's standing
in a private claim, and because the Claimants have not pleaded such in-
jury or ownership ... they have no standing to bring this Claim." 69 Since
group actions are not permitted under the Claims Settlement Declaration
or tribunal precedent, ° class arbitrations would appear to be barred in
any action in front of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. This would
also appear to be the case in other disputes brought pursuant to special-
ized arbitral rules or instruments, such as that concerning the Bank for
International Settlements7' or the securities industry.72 Alternatively, at
least one class claim appears to be proceeding under the Convention on
67. Sheibani v. United States, 37 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 946, 1 2 (2003).
68. Id. 13.
69. Id. 14.
70. Id. 7 13.
71. See, e.g., Scott Armstrong Spence, Organizing an Arbitration Involving an Interna-
tional Organization and Multiple Private Parties: The Example of the Bank for International
Settlements Arbitration, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 309, 316 (2004) (noting instruments permitting arbi-
tration involving the Bank for International Settlements "did not contemplate class action
proceedings nor allow [arbitrators] to certify a class").
72. The Arbitration Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD
Arbitration Rules) provide that class proceedings are not allowed in NASD arbitration, even if
the claims would be arbitrable on an individual basis. NASD UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION
R. 10301(d) (2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-viewall.html?
rbid=2403&elementid=4057&record-id=5135 (last visited June 24, 2009). To the extent that
NASD Arbitration Rules apply to an employment dispute, a class-wide employment claim
may be allowed to proceed in litigation, not arbitration. See Clark v. First Union Sec., Inc., 64
Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). But see Suschil v. Ameriprise Fin Serv., Inc., No.
07-2655, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27903, at *13-16 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2008). The NASD
Arbitration Rules were replaced by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
Arbitration Rules, effective Dec. 15, 2008. See FINRA ARBITRATION RULES, Rs. 12204,
13204 (2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=
2403&elementjid=4096 (last visited July 2, 2009). For further discussion of NASD arbitra-
tion, see Matthew Eisler, Difficult, Duplicative and Wasteful?: The NASD's Prohibition of
Class Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1891 (2007).
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the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States, commonly known as the Washington Convention or the
ICSID Convention.73
Although neither the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal nor the
Bank for International Settlements permitted class proceedings, the ana-
lytical approach used by these bodies is consistent with that taken in the
United States. First, the denial of the request for class treatment was
based on the explicit consideration of both the applicable rules and the
terms of the parties' arbitration agreement. That technique is also used
by arbitrators sitting in the United States to decide whether the parties
can be said to have implicitly agreed to this form of arbitration. 4 Second,
the decision in each instance was made by the arbitrators rather than by
the courts. That approach again mirrors the position now adopted in the
United States that arbitrators-rather than judges-are the ones to de-
termine whether class treatment is appropriate when an arbitration
agreement is silent or ambiguous on the matter.
At this point, class arbitration outside the United States appears to be
relatively uncommon. Although the increasing acceptance of class arbi-
tration means that some States may approach the international
enforcement of class awards with equanimity, it is likely that the proce-
dure will still be met with some hostility when class awards reach the
international enforcement stage, particularly from those jurisdictions that
do not permit representative actions in their national courts." However,
to the extent that a body of law is beginning to develop, U.S. practice
and procedures appear to be consistent with the practice and procedures
used elsewhere. This bodes well for the international enforceability of
awards arising out of U.S.-based class arbitrations, since it offsets argu-
ments that class procedures are in some way "alien" to the fundamental
definition of arbitration.76
73. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; Beccara Arbitration, supra
note 17.
74. See infra notes 200-216 and accompanying text.
75. For example, Canada and Colombia would likely exhibit little to no hostility to
class awards, since class arbitration has already been considered as a domestic remedy. Simi-
larly, those States that permit some form of representative actions in the courts would
probably be more amenable to the enforcement of class awards than those that do not allow
representative litigation. See Strong, supra note 10, at 22-29.
76. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 50, at 283 (noting that recognition of an award
may be refused if the procedure resulted in "something fundamentally different" from arbitra-
tion).
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II. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES RELATING TO CLASS ARBITRATION
Before outlining the issues to be covered in this and subsequent
Parts, it is useful to identify what will not be discussed herein. For ex-
ample, one of the biggest issues concerning class arbitration in the
United States involves the contractual waiver of the right to proceed as a
class, either in litigation and/or in arbitration, and whether such a provi-
sion is unconscionable.77 Although arguments based on waivers and
unconscionability could arise in an international enforcement action, that
discussion is outside the scope of this Article.
Another concern that could arise in international enforcement pro-
ceedings involves questions of due process and public policy.
Commentators in the United States have long debated whether class ar-
bitration sufficiently protects parties' due process rights. 79 Although it is
likely that that due process concerns will arise in international enforce-
ment proceedings (often under the rubric of "natural justice" or
"procedural fairness," since the term "due process" is not universally
adopted), the author has argued elsewhere that blanket objections based
on due process should not be allowed to overcome the presumption of
enforceability inherent in the New York Convention and many national
arbitration laws.80 Similar questions will be raised regarding the repre-
sentative nature of class arbitrations, leading to public policy objections
when class awards come to be enforced outside the United States.8 '
Again, the author has argued previously that public policy concerns un-
der Article V of the New York Convention should not result in a blanket
ban on the enforceability of international class awards.82 Although these
77. See Smit, supra note 9, at 201 (2004) (discussing ability of waiver clauses to with-
stand contract-based challenges); Stemlight, supra note 3, at 45-53; Sternlight & Jensen,
supra note 9, at 75-76 (discussing attempts by corporations to avoid class proceedings
through contractual prohibitions); Weidemaier, supra note 2, at 85, 90, 100 (discussing prohi-
bition of class arbitrations). Since most modem arbitration laws only restrict party or arbitral
autonomy to the extent necessary to protect the opportunity to present one's case and defend
against a claim, LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 1 21-16, one could argue that a pre-dispute waiver
of class arbitration violates the right to present one's case. In international matters, "[t]he
arbitration agreement may specify how the parties are to be given the necessary opportunity
'to present his case' but it cannot, at least ex ante, totally eliminate this right." KURKELA &
SNELLMAN, supra note 47, at 19. Thus, waivers of class proceedings are suspect in both inter-
national and domestic arbitration.
78. For example, if a provision is ruled unconscionable and a class arbitration subse-
quently proceeds, the losing party could raise the contractual waiver in enforcement
proceedings, claiming that the procedure did not comply with the terms of the arbitration
agreement. See New York Convention, supra note 13, arts. 1H, V(1 )(c).
79. Buckner, Due Process, supra note 30, passim; Stemlight, supra note 3, 110-17;
Weston, supra note 30, at 1742-78.
80. Strong, supra note 10, at 47-64.
81. Id. at 64-75.
82. Id.
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two arguments are significant threats to international class arbitration,
neither will be covered in this Article, since they have been discussed
adequately elsewhere. Instead, this Article focuses on objections to class
awards that are based on one of the founding principles of arbitration:
the parties' right to control arbitral procedure.
There are those who have claimed that, even in the U.S. domestic
sphere, class arbitration is improper without the explicit consent of the
parties, i.e., that class arbitration should not proceed if the arbitration
agreement is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment.83 The same argu-
ment has been made in international proceedings.4 This Article therefore
analyzes the question of implicit consent to class arbitration as both a
policy issue in Part II, by weighing the different policy concerns that
compete with party autonomy in international arbitration, and as a legal
issue in Part III, by considering matters involving the interpretation of
arbitration agreements that are silent or ambiguous. Although these poli-
cies and contract construction principles have met with approval in the
United States, it remains to be seen whether the conclusions reached by
U.S. courts and arbitrators can survive international scrutiny.
International challenges based on the terms of the arbitral agreement
will most likely come in the form of objections to the enforcement of
international class awards under Article V(1)(d) of the New York Con-
vention.85 This provision permits (but does not require) an enforcing
court to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award if
"[t]he composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. ' 86 Defendants rais-
ing objections to class arbitrations will likely focus on both elements of
87this subsection.
83. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458-59 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Yuen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (Mosk, J.,
concurring) (noting authority claiming "[c]ontractual silence on ... consolidation should not
be construed as consent").
84. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 E3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2008),
cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (describing defendants' arguments in dispute regard-
ing international maritime dispute).
85. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d). Similar provisions exist in other
international instruments on enforcement of arbitral awards. See, e.g., Panama Convention,
supra note 14, art. 5(1)(d); European Convention, supra note 14, art. IX(l)(d). It is possible
that Article V(i)(c) of the New York Convention could be interpreted to provide an argument
relating to arbitral procedure, but it seems more appropriate to consider that provision as deal-
ing with questions of arbitrability and scope than party autonomy regarding procedure. See
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(c) (allowing refusal of enforcement if "[t]he
award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the sub-
mission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration").
86. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(i)(d).
87. See infra notes 302-349 and accompanying text.
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If the international arbitral community reacts to class awards the
same way that the domestic U.S. arbitral community did in the early
days of domestic class arbitration, then objections to class awards based
on both law and policy will mimic the kind of objections that were at
one time made to awards resulting from consolidated arbitrations."1
However, while some lessons regarding class arbitration may be gleaned
from discussions about arbitral consolidation, this Article argues that the
two procedures are different in several significant ways. 9 First, certain
structural differences between consolidated and class proceedings re-
quire a different and more robust policy analysis in the case of class
arbitrations. Second, recent shifts in the law regarding the consolidation
of arbitration call into question earlier precedents and analytical ap-
proaches. Each of these points will be considered individually after a
brief discussion differentiating consolidated and class arbitration.
A. Legal and Factual Limits on Analogies Between Class and
Consolidated Arbitration
In the last twenty-five years, numerous arbitrators, courts, and com-
mentators have discussed possible analogies between class arbitrations
and consolidated arbitrations." If the two procedures can be equated,
then an analysis of the international propriety of class arbitration would
be relatively simple, since one could simply look at precedents regarding
the enforceability of awards from consolidated arbitrations when consid-
ering the international enforceability of class awards. However, there are
numerous distinctions between the two procedures that make blanket
analogies inapt.
Unlike class arbitrations, consolidated arbitrations have long been a
part of the world of international arbitration. 9' However, as willing as
88. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES:
STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE 111 (2006) (citing cases involving joinder of arbitrations).
89. See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 84-90 (arguing that consolidated arbitration is not
identical to class arbitration).
90. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 89-90,
99-101 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (noting, in particular, the rea-
soning of the arbitral panel that "consolidation of two distinct arbitrations under two distinct
arbitration clauses raises a different situation from a class action" and refusing to cite consoli-
dation cases as precedential for class arbitrations); Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra
note 6, at 312-16; Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 20, at 56; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 84-90.
91. Commentators have claimed for at least the last twenty years that "consolidation of
related proceedings is now 'a fashion whose time has come."' Alan Scott Rau & Edward F
Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J.
89, 108 (1995) (writing in 1995 and citing a publication from 1987). A great deal of commen-
tary exists on consolidation. A brief sampling includes LEW ET AL., supra note 44, In 16-39 to
16-40; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12, U 3-82 to 3-85; Gerald Asken, Multi-Party
Arbitrations in the United States, in ARBITRATION AND THE LICENSING PROCESS 5-3, 5-14 to
1038 [Vol. 30:1017
The Sounds of Silence
courts and commentators are to enter into a debate about consolidating
arbitrations, many authorities have traditionally been unwilling to re-
quire consolidation without the explicit consent of the parties.92 That
hesitancy may, however, be changing.
As the name suggests, consolidated arbitrations are very similar to
consolidated trials. 93 Consolidated proceedings in court or in arbitration
combine legally distinct actions that share similar subject matter, involve
common questions of law and fact, and determine similar issues and de-
fenses, typically between the same or related par 94fenss, ypiall enthesam r tedparties . Consolidated
proceedings result in a number of benefits, including the unification of
numerous claims that would otherwise proceed in different fora, possibly
resulting in divergent or inconsistent outcomes, as discussed in more
detail below.95 Consolidation is also said to save cost and time, although
that view is disputed in the arbitral realm.96 Efficiency is a major motivat
ing factor in consolidating proceedings in court, although it may not be
determinative in arbitration because of arbitration's simultaneous need to
consider matters of consent.
The need to demonstrate consent distinguishes consolidated arbitral
proceedings from consolidated judicial proceedings. Arbitration is a
"creature of contract," meaning that all parties to a consolidated arbitra-
tion are supposed to have signed a valid and enforceable arbitration
5-15 (Roberts Goldscheider & Michel de Haas eds., 1984); Julie C. Chiu, Consolidation of
Arbitral Proceedings and International Commercial Arbitration, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 53 passim
(1990); Bernard Hanotiau, Problems Raised by Complex Arbitrations Involving Multiple Con-
tracts-Parties-Issues-An Analysis, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 253, 330-34 (2001) [hereinafter
Hanotiau, Problems]; Lamm & Aqua, supra note 24, passim; Philippe Leboulanger, Multi-
Contract Arbitration, 13 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 54-55 (1996); Rau & Sherman, supra, at 111-18;
Rona G. Shamoon & Irene M. Ten Cate, Absence of Consent Trumps Arbitral Economy: Con-
solidation of Arbitrations Under U.S. Law, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 335 (2001); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72
IOWA L. REV. 473,494 (1987).
92. See, e.g., Fritz Nicklisch, Multi-Party Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in Major
Industrial Projects, 11 J. INT'L ARB. 57, 59 (2004) (noting the need for (1) consent and (2)
equal influence on naming of arbitrators in consolidated arbitrations).
93. Consolidated litigation proceedings are entirely uncontroversial, and nearly every
legal system permits such actions in one form or another. Martin Platte, When Should an Arbi-
trator Join Cases?, 18 ARB. INT'L 67, nn.3-4 (2002).
94. Michael F. Hoellering, Consolidated Arbitration: Will it Result in Increased Effi-
ciency or an Affront to Party Autonomy?, 52 Disp. RESOL. J., 41 (1997); Matthew D. Schwartz,
Note, Multiparty Disputes and Consolidation Arbitrations: An Oxymoron or the Solution to a
Continuing Dilemma?, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 341, 341 n.2 (1990); Stipanowich, supra
note 91, at 505-06.
95. JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARBITRATION AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 230
(2001); Chiu, supra note 91, at 55-56; Leboulanger, supra note 91, at 62-63; infra notes 146-
147 and accompanying text.
96. FRICK, supra note 95, at 230-31; Chiu, supra note 91, at 55-56; Leboulanger, supra
note 91, at 62-63.
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agreement with all other participants.97 Problems with consolidated arbi-
trations often revolve around the absence of a signed arbitration
agreement between all the parties to the consolidated proceeding.98 The
issue is not that of bringing a non-signatory into the proceedings, al-
though non-signatory issues can arise in the context of a consolidated
arbitration.99 Instead, the problem relates to whether the parties-who
have indisputably agreed to arbitrate their disputes-can be said to have
consented to this type of proceeding (i.e., a consolidated arbitration),
since the arbitration agreements are silent or ambiguous regarding multi-
party proceedings.
Commentators often distinguish between the consolidation of ac-
tions with multiple parties to a single contract and the consolidation of
actions with multiple parties to different, but related, contracts.' °° The
latter is more similar to class arbitration, which also involves a large
number of individual, bilateral arbitration agreements with only one
97. Stipanowich, supra note 91, at 476; see also W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and
Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1995).
98. Consolidated arbitrations can arise in a variety of manners, often intersecting with
issues of joinder of parties. See BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY,
MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 358-61, 402, 428 (2005). Although
the paradigmatic request to consolidate involves different proceedings between the same par-
ties (A-B and A-B), other consolidation requests involve multiple parties that may not be in
contractual privity with one another (for example, a request to consolidate an arbitration in-
volving A and B with an arbitration involving B and C, but not relating to a single contract
between A, B, and C). See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Indus. Power, Inc. v. Zum EPC Servs., Inc., No.
01 C-5608, 2001 WL 1397881 (N.D. I11. Nov. 07, 2001) (distinguishing a case involving "a
single agreement whereas this case.., involved multiple agreements").
99. For example, instead of trying to consolidate arbitrations between A and B and B
and C, one might argue that C is really a party to the arbitration agreement between A and B,
even though C did not technically sign the agreement. There are a number of ways to bind
non-signatories to an arbitration agreement, including consent, agency, assumption, alter ego,
piercing the corporate veil, estoppel, incorporation by reference, and the group of companies
doctrine. See, e.g., Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.
1995) (outlining means of obtaining arbitral jurisdiction over non-signatories in a U.S. pro-
ceeding); Hanotiau, Groups of Companies, supra note 43, at 281; Herzfeld, supra note 60, at
306-07 (discussing shareholder disputes). Some have said that the United States has the most
liberal approach to extending the arbitration agreement to non-signatories. Hanotiau, Groups
of Companies, supra note 43, at 287; James M. Hosking, Non-Signatories and International
Arbitration in the United States: The Quest for Consent, 20 ARB. INT'L 289, 303 (2004) (con-
cluding that "[w]hile the case law generally shows a deference to consent, especially in the
United States one finds that it sometimes takes a backseat" to efficiency and the "presumption
of arbitrability"); Lamm & Aqua, supra note 24, at 718-30 (outlining means of obtaining
arbitral jurisdiction over non-signatories in an international proceeding).
100. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12, 3-73; Bernard Hanotiau, Complex Multi-
contract-Multiparty Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 369, 371 (1998) [hereinafter Hanotiau,
Multiparty Arbitration]; Platte, supra note 93, nn. 18-22; see also Nicklisch, supra note 92, at
59-60 (describing consortia agreements and arguing that these cause "no problem" to consoli-
dation efforts); id. at 71 (noting "multi-party arbitration will present no major problems" if
parties can be divided into sides "with obviously concordant interests").
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party-the defendant-in common. However, the scope of the two types
of joined actions varies significantly. Even when consolidation involves
parties to different, but related, contracts, the number of entities that are
involved is usually quite small, most often in the range of three to five.'0 '
Class arbitrations, on the other hand, can include hundreds to hundreds
of thousands of parties.0 2 Furthermore, consolidated arbitrations can in-
volve conflicts of interest between those who are considered joint
claimants or joint respondents, whereas parties to class arbitration typi-
cally do not experience these sorts of conflicts of interest among
claimant or defendant groups.103
Whether a multi-party/multi-contract proceeding is possible depends
on the language found in the arbitration agreements. As a rule,
"[a]rbitrators may extend their jurisdiction to connected agreements only
if the intention of the parties and the language of the relevant instruments
permit such an extension. ' 4 Conceptually speaking, there are fewer
problems consolidating proceedings if the different arbitration agree-
ments contain identical language.' 5 Indeed, "it is generally legitimate to
presume that by including identical arbitration clauses in the various re-
lated contracts, the parties intended to submit the entire operation to a
single arbitral tribunal."'0 6 This is also true with class arbitrations-it is
easier to justify class proceedings when all the agreements are the same.
However, if the individual arbitration agreements vary in their
101. One exceptional case involved the breakup of the Andersen Organisation, with 140
different parties. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 16-57 to 16-58; Final Award in the Arbitration
of Andersen Consulting Business Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Mem-
ber Firms and Andersen Worldwide Societe Coopirative, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451 passim
(1999); Judgment of the Swiss Federal Court (English Translation), 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
559 passim (1999); see also Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra note 100, at 375-76
(discussing umbrella agreements).
102. See, e.g., Bagpeddler.com v. U.S. Bancorp, Case No. 11 181 0032204 (AAA, May
4, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4667 (concerning an arbitral class of up to
400,000 internet vendors). Numerosity is a requirement for judicial class treatment in the U.S.
and elsewhere, and that requirement has been extended to class arbitration as well. FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(a); AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 4(a)(1); JAMS CLASS ARBI-
TRATION RULES, supra note 30, R. 3(a)(1); NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note
30, proc. A(l); RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6-8 (2004) (discussing Australian class actions); Edward F
Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to
American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 424-30 (2002) (discussing Australian and
Canadian class actions). But see Gidi, supra note 25, at 367 n.167 (noting no numerosity re-
quirement in Brazilian judicial group actions).
103. See infra notes 326-327 and accompanying text.
104. Leboulanger, supra note 91, at 51; accord Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra
note 100, at 378.
105. Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra note 100, at 376; Whitesell & Silva-
Romero, supra note 6, at 15.
106. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 521.
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requirements-for example, by choosing different seats for the arbitra-
tion or different governing rules or laws-then both consolidation and
class arbitration may be less appropriate, since the parties' expressed
wishes cannot be given effect.' 7
In the context of consolidation, it has been said that consolidation of
separate arbitrations is impossible with conflicting arbitration agree-
ments, absent relevant national laws or arbitral rules permitting it.' 8
However, the absence of such laws or rules does not prohibit the appro-
priate authorities from "further exploring the true intentions of the
parties," which suggests that the unavailability of such laws or rules does
not require a conclusion that consolidation-or, by extension, class arbi-
tration-is improper in every case.' °9 Nevertheless, the more similar the
different agreements are, the more likely class or consolidated treatment
will be allowed, and the more dissimilar the agreements, the less likely
group treatment will be.
Interestingly, this is one of the areas where class and consolidated
arbitrations differ significantly, which suggests that a blanket analogy
between the two proceedings is inapt. As a rule, consolidated arbitrations
are more likely to result in the need to reconcile conflicting contract pro-
visions, including those regarding language, location, selection of
arbitrators, applicable procedural rule sets, and/or governing law, often
because those arbitration agreements were negotiated separately with an
eye to individual transaction needs."0 Class arbitration does not raise the
same issues, since the members of the class will likely all have identical
(or, as in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Bazzle,'" functionally identi-
cal) arbitration agreements with the defendant, often because the
arbitration agreements are part of a non-negotiable form contract."2
However, to the extent that minor variations exist in the relevant arbitral
agreements, courts and/or arbitrators can invoke the standing interpretive
rule that the drafter should bear the burden of any inconsistencies, so as
to avoid a situation where defendants could avoid or limit class arbitra-
tion simply by periodically making minor, insignificant changes to the
arbitration provisions so that no single class would grow too large."3
107. Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra note 100, at 376; Platte, supra note 93,
nn.36-41.
108. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 521.
109. Id.
110. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 86.
111. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
112. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 86-87.
113. See Philip Allen Lacovara, Class Action Arbitrations-The Challenge for the Busi-
ness Community, 24 ARB. INT'L 541, 559 (2008) (encouraging companies to create variations
in arbitration agreements); see also GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 479 (noting arbitra-
tors and courts may appropriately adopt the principle of interpretation contra proferentem).
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Like consolidated arbitrations (at least to some degree), class arbitra-
tions combine claims held by a group of individuals with (1) the same or
similar injuries and (2) the same or similar arbitration agreements with
the defendant(s). ' 4 Like consolidated arbitrations, class arbitrations also
require the existence of valid arbitration agreements between the parties.
Although class arbitrations were at one time viewed with some distrust,
they have become an accepted means of addressing both domestic and
international disputes, at least within the United States." 5 Class arbitra-
tions have also been considered outside the United States in both
common and civil law jurisdictions," 6 although there are no known ac-
tions outside the United States to enforce a class award arising out of a
U.S.-based arbitration.
B. Policy Issues Regarding Class Arbitration
The preceding subsection described some of the structural and legal
differences between consolidated and class arbitrations to demonstrate
why some-but not all-analogies between the two procedures are ap-
propriate. This subsection focuses on policy considerations regarding
class arbitration to evaluate whether the procedure is consistent with the
aims and goals of international arbitration.
It is useful to begin by outlining the position asserted by opponents
to class arbitration. The primary policy argument made by those who
would restrict the availability of class arbitration is that class proceed-
ings may not be ordered absent the clear, express, and unanimous
consent of the parties.' These "strict constructionists" often emphasize
the role of party autonomy in arbitration and believe that the default
position-i.e., the position that should be taken in cases where the arbi-
tration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment-should be
114. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, at R.4 (describing requirements
to pursue a class arbitration); JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, R. 3 (describ-
ing the same). Both the AAA Supplementary Rules and the JAMS Class Arbitration Rules are
based on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Weidemaier, supra note 2, at 94-95.
The requirements of the National Arbitration Forum are slightly less detailed. NAF CLASS
ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 30, passim.
115. Over 120 such actions were filed with one arbitration provider between 2003 and
early 2007. Weidemaier, supra note 2, at 70; see also HANOTIAU, supra note 98, 257-79.
116. See infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
117. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 458-59 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting); Yuen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (Grignon,
J., concurring) (noting that authority claiming "[clontractual silence on ... consolidation
should not be construed as consent"); Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 312.
The discussion in this Article is limited to questions regarding consent to this type of arbitra-
tion, i.e., class proceedings; the assumption is that all parties have explicitly consented to
arbitrate their disputes.
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to avoid class treatment in favor of individual arbitration."8 Advocates
for this position claim that they are protecting party autonomy, which is
the most fundamental of all policies regarding arbitration.
This Article takes issue with strict constructionism as a matter of
policy. Although party autonomy is and should remain important, a nar-
row interpretive stance is contrary to contemporary arbitration law and
practice. For example, Yves Derains has stated that the consensual aspect
of arbitration "should not be overestimated."' Similarly, Bernard Hano-
tiau has argued that it is time "to bury once and for all [the] obsolete
principle of restrictive interpretation of arbitral clauses" in light of "[t]he
total liberalisation of arbitration in many western countries," which he
claims is due to the recognition that arbitration is no longer "a second-
class method of dispute settlement, but simply an additional one, perhaps
more appropriate for certain categories of disputes, and much needed to
alleviate the plight of overburdened national courts."'2 ° Indeed, Em-
manuel Gaillard has said that the principle of strict interpretation "is
generally rejected in international arbitration," since it is
118. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 458-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Yuen, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
132 (Grignon, J., concurring); Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 312. When
considering what default rule to apply, some experts suggest that the default should "closely
mimic[ ] the 'hypothetical bargain' that the parties themselves would have chosen in a com-
pletely spelled-out agreement-or, perhaps, the bargain that most similarly situated parties
would have chosen, or that it would be rationale for such parties to have chosen ex ante." Rau
& Sherman, supra note 91, at 115 (discussing consolidation). However, there may be instances
where the opposite may be true, and it may be preferable to choose a default provision that
parties are unlikely to choose, but allow them to "opt out" if they disagree with its effect. Id.;
see also Ian Ayres, Ya-huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
589, 589-90 (2006) (describing the so-called "penalty default" rule). In any event, the choice
of a default rule will likely affect the bargaining positions of the parties. See Gidi, supra note
25, at 338; Rau & Sherman, supra note 91, at 115 (discussing consolidation); id. at 117 n.152
(noting parties may be "reluctant to opt out even of rules that are inefficient for them" if the
transaction costs to alter the default rule are too high or onerous). There is a considerable body
of literature concerning default rules, often considering the issue from a law and economics
perspective. Although interesting, this discussion is outside the scope of the current Article.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 (2003); Ian
Ayres & Robert Gernter, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of De-
fault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Majoritarian vs.
Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gernter, Strategic
Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992);
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003).
119. Yves Derains, The Limits of the Arbitration Agreement in Contracts Involving More
than Two Parties, in ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF ARBITRATION BULLETIN, COMPLEX AR-
BITRATIONS-SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, 25, 33 (2003) (giving more weight to the parties' right to
choose arbitrators).
120. Hanotiau, Problems, supra note 91, at 256; accord Derains, supra note 119, at 27.
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based on the idea that an arbitration agreement constitutes an
exception to the principle of the jurisdiction of the courts, and
that, as laws of exception are strictly interpreted, the same
should apply to arbitration agreements. This view is not consis-
tent with the fact that arbitration is now unanimously considered
to be a normal means of settling international disputes.'
2
'
Alan Scott Rau phrases the issue somewhat differently, looking at the
issues relating to consent in concentric circles and requiring a stricter
rule of interpretation in cases involving fundamental, core issues (such
as the decision to arbitrate in the first place), and permitting a looser ap-
proach in which the parties have the burden to "draft in advance around
any default rule" on those issues-such as procedure-that are farther
out from the core.122
Furthermore, party preferences have always been weighed against
other concerns. For example, no matter what the parties have agreed
among themselves, they are not permitted to violate basic principles of
due process or public policy.2 ' Similarly, parties cannot, as a rule, pri-
vately dispose of concerns that States have deemed non-arbitrable,124 nor
can parties completely evade principles of mandatory law. 25 There are
even limits to the ability of the parties to choose arbitrators. 26 Party
autonomy is, quite simply, not the only policy at issue. Instead, courts
and arbitrators must take other competing interests and principles into
account.'
27
One of the most important-although controversial-factors that
courts and arbitrators must consider is efficiency. Traditionally, parties
have been said to favor arbitration over litigation because arbitration is
121. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 480 (citations omitted) (noting "[tihis has
been frequently confirmed in arbitral case law").
122. Rau, supra note 43, at 247 (noting also that "an initial agreement to submit to arbi-
tration permits us to temper somewhat the absolutism of our insistence on the usual
understanding of consent").
123. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V; Strong, supra note 10, at 47-75.
124. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II; William W. Park, Private Adjudicators
and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 629, 636-37 (1986) [hereinafter Park, Private Adjudicators]. Parties could attempt to
evade this rule by seating and enforcing the arbitration in locations where the matter is arbi-
trable, but such efforts would be difficult and dependent on certain fortuitous factual
scenarios.
125. Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law Versus Parry Autonomy in International
Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 23, 23 (1997); Donald F Donovan & Alexander K.A.
Greenawalt, Mitsubishi After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules Before Courts and International
Arbitrators, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 43, at 11,
43.
126. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 783-85.
127. See Park, Private Adjudicators, supra note 124, at 640 (prioritizing different com-
peting interests in arbitration).
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more efficient, but in this context, the term "efficiency" relates solely to
the benefits that inure to the parties who have contracted to arbitrate their
dispute and only with respect to one particular proceeding.' The defini-
tion of "efficiency" in multi-party arbitration is also notoriously vague,
referring to everything from the avoidance of duplicative dispute resolu-
tion procedures in different fora to the prevention of inconsistent results
and minimization of costs.'2 9 However, it has always been true that the
benefits of efficiency in arbitration have never been aimed at third par-
ties, the courts, or the public at large, nor have they extended to other,
non-arbitrable disputes between the parties to a particular arbitration
agreement.'3° Indeed, that is why arguments based on efficiency ration-
ales have not always been successful when raised in the context of
consolidated arbitrations. Principles of "mere" efficiency are also often
overcome when the consolidated proceeding would involve a third party
stranger (either as a party or an arbitrator) to the arbitration, since per-
mitting non-parties to participate in an arbitration would violate the type
of proceeding to which the original signatories to the contract agreed.1
3
Interestingly, concerns about third party strangers have also prevailed in
situations where the "strangers" involved the same parties or arbitrators
that were involved in the initial arbitration; in these cases, the fact that
the parties had agreed to arbitration under different contracts or relating
to different types of disputes was sufficient to block consolidation, since
it was decided that each of the proceedings was meant to be individual,
not combined.'
3 2
As illogical as it may seem to consider known parties as strangers,
this approach is consistent with decisions and commentary indicating
that when parties choose arbitration, they are deemed to have chosen to
relinquish certain rights, including the right to an efficient proceeding.'33
128. BORN, supra note 15, at 9-11.
129. FRICK, supra note 95, at 230; LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 16-92; Chiu, supra note
91, at 55-56; Leboulanger, supra note 91, at 62-63; Rau & Sherman, supra note 91, at 109
n.Il0; Schwartz, supra note 94, at 343; Stipanowich, supra note 91, at 502; Dean B. Thom-
son, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 137, 166 (1994) (discussing the "empty chair" syndrome).
130. Even the famously activist Lord Denning admitted that the English court had no
power to consolidate arbitrations over the objection of the parties, no matter how desirable it
might be to avoid inconsistent judgments and findings on important issues in common. Abu
Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. v. E. Bechtel Co., [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425, 427 (Lord Den-
ning) (Eng.).
131. Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra note 100, at 372, 389-90; Platte, supra
note 93, nn.5-8.
132. Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra note 100, at 372, 389-90; Platte, supra
note 93, nn.5-8; Rau, supra note 43, at 226-29.
133. See, e.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) ("[T]he
basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter
what the parties' wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other con-
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Indeed, those courts that have ordered consolidated or class arbitration
on the basis of efficiency or other arguments have been criticized as fail-
ing to show the proper respect for party autonomy and for exceeding
their power.1
3 4
However, as arbitration becomes more widespread and diverse in its
forms, the views about the role of efficiency considerations may be
changing. Although efficiency may not carry the same weight as due
process and party autonomy in international proceedings, it is being
given increasing respect, particularly when complex or novel questions
of procedure are involved.35 Furthermore, efficiency can and should play
a role in procedural determinations to the extent that parties are assumed
to have contracted for an efficient procedure; if that is true, then an arbi-
trator's reliance on efficiency rationales can be said to be a legitimate
means of getting to the parties' implied consent. In accordance with this
principle, courts have explicitly recognized that arbitrators may take effi-
ciency into account when they are considering the possibility of class
arbitration, although the courts in those cases may be conflating a step
one determination (will this clause support class arbitration) with a step
two determination (do the facts in this case suggest class treatment as the
116best method of resolving this dispute).
If efficiency, of itself, is not a sufficient reason to permit consolida-
tion, can efficiency be appropriately considered when determining
whether an arbitration agreement that is silent or ambiguous as to group
treatment will permit class arbitration? Deeper analysis of how effi-
ciency concerns play out in class arbitration suggests that the purported
analogy to consolidation is not quite apt, since class arbitration involves
policy considerations that do not exist in consolidated actions.
The key difference is that consolidating two or more arbitrations
typically benefits no one other than the parties themselves, and some-
times the benefit inures to only some of the parties. For example, a
general contractor who has been sued by a client may find it efficient to
bring a variety of subcontractors into the initial arbitration. The
tracts, 'are enforced according to their terms,' and according to the intentions of the parties.")
(citations omitted).
134. FRICK, supra note 95, at 237; Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at
312.
135. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12, 3-73; Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Global-
ization ofArbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1321-22 (2003); Platte, supra
note 93, nn.6-7. But see FRICK, supra note 95, at 231-32 (claiming "efficiency is not in itself a
goal of a dispute resolution mechanism, at least in proceedings that are not publicly fi-
nanced").
136. Dorinco Reins. Co. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. 07-12622, 2008 WL 192270, at *10
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2008); Markel Int'l Ins. Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d
200, 204, 205 (D.N.J. 2006); see also AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, Rs. 3, 5;
JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES supra note 30, Rs. 2-4.
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individual subcontractors, however, might not find this to be an efficient
method of resolving disputes associated with this particular contract, nor
might the client.
However, the benefits of efficiency in class arbitration extend not
only to parties who are actively involved in the proceeding-i.e., the de-
fendant(s) and named claimants-but also to scores of others, including
both the unnamed claimants and, arguably, society as a whole. For ex-
ample, it is possible that certain low-value claims will not be brought,
either in court or in arbitration, without the ability to share the costs as-
sociated with pursuing the claim over a large number of people. 37 The
failure to certify a class (in a class action or a class arbitration) can
sound the "death knell" of a cause of action, since claimants cannot jus-
tify the financial costs associated with pursuing their claims individually,
no matter how meritorious those claims may be as a matter of law or
social policy.'38 This is one of the reasons why Jean Sternlight has argued
that the consequences of a decision to refuse class arbitration are differ-
ent than a refusal to order consolidation. 9 Without consolidation of
multiple claims, disputes can still go forward individually, albeit with
some additional expense.' 40 Without classwide arbitration, many small
claims simply cannot or will not be heard.
4
'
Class proceedings can also serve society as a whole, although again,
critics would take a different view.' 42 Class arbitration-like its judicial
equivalent, class action litigation-can be used as a means of promoting
137. These arguments can be raised in the context of discussions about efficiency or
unconscionability. See, e.g., Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886, 2008 WL 4507573, at
*6 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2008); Taylor v. First N. Am. Bank, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1319 (M.D.
Ala. 2004) (including a claim based on costs and a related claim based on unconscionability).
The issue of unconscionability is outside the scope of this Article.
138. Weston, supra note 30, at 1728. Certification also has consequences. Often, defen-
dants will seek to settle a case as soon as possible after a court has decided to certify a class,
since the cost of defending a class action is immense. Id.
139. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 86.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Criticisms of judicial class actions are well-known and longstanding, and it is as-
sumed that the reader is familiar with the basic parameters of that debate. Issues relevant to
the current Article are discussed below. See infra notes 150-157 and accompanying text. How-
ever, those interested in further reading can see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class
Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008); John C. Coffey, Ac-
countability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better than
"Voice", 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407 (2008); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the
Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 103 (2006); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-33 (1991). Congress considered the pros and cons of class actions
when enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a), 119 Stat. 4
(2005).
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social justice.' 3 Not only do class procedures properly distribute the
economic costs associated with certain risky behaviors (as in tort cases),
they can bring public attention and pressure to bear on corporate defen-
dants who might otherwise be inclined to act in their own short-term
self-interest (as in shareholder suits or environmental actions). Although
class claimants receive the financial rewards associated with the claim,
society as a whole benefits by the cessation of socially or economically
detrimental behavior. Other potential defendants are also deterred from
pursuing similar courses of action.
Although it is tempting to characterize class arbitration's struggle to
balance public and private concerns as unique, it is not. An assessment of
the relative weight of public and private interests in arbitration has been
undertaken in several different contexts,' 4 and the fact that the interna-
tional arbitral community even entertains these sorts of discussions, let
alone debates them at the highest levels, suggests that the view that arbi-
tration is an entirely private matter between two individuals-although
attractively and deceptively simple' 45-is not universally held. Instead,
143. Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 165, 172-74 (2001); see also Stemlight, supra note 3, at 28 (de-
scribing the nature and benefits of class actions); Weston, supra note 30, at 1727 (describing
the same).
144. For example, several commentators have recently argued that there is, or should be,
a public interest exception to arbitral confidentiality. See, e.g., Loukas A. Mistelis, Confidenti-
ality and Third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada and Methanex Corporation v. United
States, 21 ARB. INT'L 211, 211-12 (2005); Andrew Tweeddale, Confidentiality in Arbitration
and the Public Interest Exception, 21 ARB. INT'L 59, 59-60 (2005). Debates about the public
versus private role of arbitration have also raged in the context of antitrust and other "public"
causes of action. See, e.g., Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 30-38 (discussing ju-
risprudence in the wake of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626 (1985), and concluding "it would be wrong to assume there are no public rights
at issue in the resolution of even purely 'private' disputes"); Park, Private Adjudicators, supra
note 124, at 638.
145. For example, class arbitration can be said to give full effect to the parties' recog-
nized desire to arbitrate their disputes rather than litigate them, something which would
qualify as a private, rather than a public, interest. The only real question is whether the dispute
should be arbitrated individually or collectively, which is essentially a question of form. How-
ever, such differences are again not unique to class arbitration, since parties often wrangle
about procedural matters, both large and small. In such cases, arbitrators often utilize the
"principle of effective interpretation," which requires adoption of an approach that is most
likely to "establish an effective machinery for the settlement of disputes covered by the arbi-
tration clause." GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 1 478 (quoting Preliminary Award in ICC
case No. 2321 (1974), Two Israeli Cos. v. Gov't of an African State, 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 133
(1976)); see also Partial Award in ICC Case No. 7920 (1993), Distributor v. Mfr. (Spain v.
Italy), 23 Y.B. COM. ARB. 80, 82-83 (1998) (outlining interpretive method used); Avv. Aldo
Frignani, Drafting Arbitration Agreements, 24 ARB. INT'L 561 (2008) (noting "[p]athological
clauses have formed the core of the academic debate as to whether arbitrators, in their search
to discover the true intention of the parties, should refer to the principles of strict interpreta-
tion or to that of interpretation in favorem validitatis" and describing necessary interpretive
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public interests can and should play some role in the development of the
law of arbitration, particularly in the case of class arbitrations.
Before weighing the competing policy interests, they must be identi-
fied in detail. Judge Jack Weinstein, one of the foremost experts on U.S.
class actions,4 6 has described a number of advantages associated with
class actions. Many of these advantages also apply to class arbitration.
Some promote efficiency while others promote social justice. Thus,
Weinstein favors class actions because:
(1) They reduce duplication of discovery, motion practice, and
pretrial procedures.
(2) They allow a single judge to familiarize himself or herself
with the legal and factual issues.
(3) They provide consistency of results for all the injured and for
the defendants.
(4) They enhance the possibility of a single action resolving the
entire problem, hence preventing the need for repetitive litiga-
tion of similar issues. Those who opt out of the class (as is
often possible) will generally represent but a small percentage
of possible claimants.
(5) They permit plaintiffs' attorneys to generate enough capital to
conduct the litigation on a playing field level for both sides.
(6) They enhance the possibility of a global settlement, which
can provide reasonable relief for prospective claimants while
limiting the costs for both parties and providing closure to the
dispute for defendants.
(7) They provide the possibility of a single fair punitive damage
amount instead of repetitive and overlapping punishment ....
(8) They give the court power to control legal fees, which may
otherwise be much greater than warranted.
(9) They allow a single appellate panel to review the case.
(10)Perhaps most important, they permit recoveries for small
claims by those who may not even know they were injured
and almost certainly would not bother to sue even if they had
known. By, in theory, requiring a defendant to pay the entire
steps); Alok Jain, Pathological Arbitration Clauses and Indian Courts, 25 ARB. INT'L 433,
441-47 (2008) (describing interpretive method used in India).
146. Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Briej) Genealogy of the Class Ac-
tion Crisis, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 719, 735 (2006).
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social cost of its delicts they should avoid much of the reason
for high punitive damages.'
47
Class actions (or arbitrations) also allow defendants to bring complex
disputes to a close relatively quickly, thus allowing defendants to "get on
with their affairs" and avoid large transactional costs.'
48
Julian Lew has identified similar benefits to multi-party arbitration
(albeit outside the class context), suggesting multi-party arbitration
should proceed when to do so would encourage procedural economy,
avoid inconsistent awards, increase fairness by facilitating fact-finding
and presentation of legal and factual arguments, address any confidenti-
ality concerns, and uphold the equal ability to choose arbitrators. 
49
The benefits of class actions are balanced by a number of disadvan-
tages. For example, Weinstein notes:
(1) The judge may lack familiarity with the law if more than one
jurisdiction's substantive law must be applied.
(2) They increase the complexity of the litigation.
(3) They place a significant burden on individual courts, since
they are time consuming, containing more factual and legal
issues than any individual case.
(4) They remove local issues from their normal venue. Forum
shopping problems are compounded.
(5) They supersede the local jury's role and replace it with a jury
that may be unfamiliar with local conditions.
(6) They often require the application of many different substan-
tive laws, some of which are still in a state of uncertainty.
(7) They attenuate the usual individual client-attorney relation-
ship, creating new ethical pressures.
(8) They are often in significant tension with federalism assump-
tions. One elected state county judge may bind the nation.
147. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 172-74; see also Sternlight, supra note 3, at 28 (de-
scribing the nature and benefit of class actions); Weston, supra note 30, at 1727 (describing
the same).
148. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 174-75.
149. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 16-92; accord Platte, supra note 93, nn.87-96. Lew
also notes that multi-party arbitration may not be appropriate in cases where the multi-party
nature of the proceedings will make the award "vulnerable to challenges and anti-enforcement
actions," which could be problematic in the early years of class arbitration, when the interna-
tional community will be at its most skeptical about the procedure. LEW ET AL., supra note 44,
T 16-93.
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(9) They may force defendants to settle because of the threat of
huge awards.
(1O)Finally, there is the fundamental problem that the Supreme
Court has been dealing with-protecting the rights of those
class members with little knowledge of the suit, virtually no
ability to monitor their attorneys, and potential conflicts with
other members of the class. 50
Although most of the advantages of class actions apply equally to
class arbitration, the disadvantages of judicial class actions do not track
class arbitration quite as closely, due to the privatized nature of arbitra-
tion. For example, the courts are not clogged by large cases, since
arbitrators work independently, nor are there choice of forum or jury is-
sues, since the parties have chosen arbitration precisely to avoid such
concerns." Furthermore, as the preceding discussion has shown, class
arbitration is superior to judicial class actions as a matter of procedure,
since the limitations on party disclosure in arbitration-particularly
when compared to the broad ranging judicial discovery available in U.S.
litigation-may make class arbitration a more palatable group dispute
resolution device for corporate defendants, particularly for non-U.S. de-
fendants who worry about the excesses of U.S. discovery.'52 Furthermore,
at least one internationally recognized commentator has concluded that
arbitrators are "as well equipped as courts" to deal with the special pro-
cedural concerns associated with class arbitration.'53 Thus, the only
remaining concerns involve ethical issues, pressure to settle, and due
process. However, none of these need be insurmountable. For example,
the author has argued elsewhere that due process concerns cannot result
in a blanket objection to the international enforceability of class
awards.'5 4 It is also true that pressure to settle will arise whether a request
150. Weinstein, supra note 143, at 172-74; see also Smit, supra note 9, at 210 (criticiz-
ing class actions); Sternlight, supra note 3, at 34-37 (same).
151. LEW ET AL., supra note 44,'f 1-7 to 1-30.
152. See, e.g., Baumgartner, supra note 6, at 310-11 (discussing presumptions made
regarding U.S.-style class actions); Gidi, supra note 25, at 322, 324 n.22, 371 (discussing the
evolution of the "traditional myth" regarding U.S. class actions amongst civil law scholars);
Herzfeld, supra note 60, at 301 (noting defendants may prefer class arbitration to avoid judi-
cial discovery). When considering international proceedings, there is also the issue of the
relative ease of international enforcement of arbitral awards versus court judgments. These
factors thus contradict the claim that "[in actual practice, the procedure [for class arbitration]
would differ very little from litigation and would therefore offer few, if any, advantages." HA-
NOTIAU, supra note 98, 1 276-77.
153. HANOTIAU, supra note 98, 1 276.
154. Strong, supra note 10, at 64-75.
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to proceed as a class is granted or denied.'55 Furthermore, the concern
about the attenuation of the attorney-client relationship is the same in
both class arbitrations and class actions, and has not been deemed suffi-
cient to bar class proceedings in court.'
56
Thus, as a matter of policy, class arbitrations would seem at least as
socially beneficial, and possibly more so, than class actions. ' This may
be particularly true with international class arbitrations, since (1) arbitral
awards are almost universally easier to enforce internationally than court
judgments' 58 and (2) class action judgments are particularly disfavored
outside the United States, which diminishes the likelihood of interna-
tional recovery in class proceedings."9 It may be that in some cases, class
awards are the best or only realistic way to promote effective interna-
tional recovery for certain claims.60
Finally, one must consider the relevance of the increasingly pro-
arbitration stance taken by countries all over the world. While the United
States may sometimes be more staunchly pro-arbitration than other ju-
risdictions, 6' there has been widespread adoption of enforcement
155. Weston, supra note 30, at 1728; see also supra note 138 and accompanying text
(regarding the "death knell" of a cause of action).
156. See Weston, supra note 30, at 1776-77 (noting ethical problems relating to ade-
quate representation in class action and class arbitration).
157. Granted, this conclusion takes Judge Weinstein's analysis at face value. Opponents
to class actions and class arbitrations would focus more heavily on the disadvantages associ-
ated with class proceedings. See supra notes 142, 150 and accompanying text. Critics of class
arbitration would also point to the lack of appellate review as a disadvantage associated spe-
cifically with private dispute resolution. Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock,
Franchising, Arbitration, and the Future of the Class Action (forthcoming 2009). As is the
case with many matters involving class treatment, opinions will likely be strongly held and
widely varying. Compare 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE, § 2:14 (2006) ("As the potential availability of class-wide arbitration
threatens to multiply exponentially the exposure on what is facially a single-consumer issue,
companies should strongly consider including in their standard arbitration agreements an
express provision barring class action litigation or arbitration."), with 3 ALBA CONTE & HER-
BERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 9:67 n.2 (2008) ("The bar on class
arbitration threatens the premise that arbitration can be a fair and adequate mechanism for
enforcing statutory rights.").
158. BORN, supra note 15, at 7-10, 19.
159. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975) (admit-
ting practitioner affidavits from the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, and France stating that courts in those jurisdictions would not enforce
judgments resulting from American class actions); John C.L. Dixon, The Res Judicata Effect
in England of a U.S. Class Action Settlement, 46 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 134, 136, 140 (1997)
(discussing how concepts of natural justice affect English courts' treatment of class action
judgments and settlements); Richard H. Dreyfuss, Class Action Judgment Enforcement in
Italy: Procedural "Due Process" Requirements, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 5, 19, 25-26
(2002) (discussing Italian courts' scrutiny of U.S. class action judgments).
160. See, e.g., Howells & James, supra note 7, at 48-55 (concerning consumer claims).
161. Hanotiau, Groups of Companies, supra note 43, at 287.
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mechanisms such as the New York Convention 6 and increasing accep-
tance of liberalizing legislation such as the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) Model Arbitral Law.163 The
scope of arbitrable issues has also expanded steadily over the years, sug-
gesting that States now put more trust in arbitrators' ability to handle
complex issues, including those that may affect social rights and inter-
ests.' 6 Given the current climate, there may be an increased receptivity
to new developments regarding the various forms of arbitration.
These observations suggest that a narrow view of arbitral policy that
effectively elevates party autonomy over all other concerns in cases
where the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to class treat-
ment may not be well grounded. While the parties' preferences-both
expressed and implied-should be respected, there is no policy reason to
support a presumption in favor of denying class arbitration in cases of
contractual silence or ambiguity. Indeed, the opposite position-that
class arbitration may arise through implied, rather than merely express,
consent-seems to be in far better alignment with current views in the
field. Of course it is conceivable that arbitrators could take the view that
class arbitration is or should be disfavored in all but the most compelling165
cases. While this would require arbitrators as a group to operate con-
sistently in a manner that is contrary to their own financial interests
(something that those who are cynical about the objectivity of arbitration
might doubt),' 66 it is at least equally true that arbitrators in international
commercial matters operate ethically and disinterestedly.
As persuasive as they are, the policy arguments supporting class ar-
bitration are not so compelling so as to permit arbitrators to disregard
party autonomy altogether. If the search for implied consent as a matter
of law is too tortuous, then the task should be discarded and the strict
162. Park & Yanos, supra note 14, at 257.
163. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 19.
164. Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 33; Herzfeld, supra note 60, at 326. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that if there is any doubt as to the scope of arbitrable
issues, they should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); HANOTIAU, supra note 98, 1266; Rau, supra
note 43, at 243-44; see also Geneva Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Case No. 193, In-
terim Award of 21 Oct. 2002, 24 ASA BULL. 61, 40 (2006) (noting interpretive principle of
in favorem arbitri).
165. It is typically for the arbitrator rather than the court to decide whether to proceed as
a class. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
166. Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach
to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 71 (2005); see also P. Christine
Deruelle & Robert Clayton Roesch, Gaming the Rigged Class Arbitration Game: How We Got
Here and Where We Go Now-Part I, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2007, at 9 (claiming
"[a]s of June 15, 2007, AAA arbitrators have rendered 51 Clause Construction Awards con-
cerning otherwise silent arbitration agreements, and in all but two of those decisions, the
arbitrators have allowed class wide proceedings").
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constructionists' views should prevail in cases of contractual silence or
ambiguity. 67 Therefore it must be seen whether, as a matter of law, it is
possible to justify a finding of implied consent in agreements that are
silent or ambiguous as to class treatment through reliance on internation-
ally acknowledged principles of contract construction.16 This issue is
covered in the following section.
III. LEGAL ISSUES THAT ARISE WHEN THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
IS SILENT OR AMBIGUOUS AS TO CLASS TREATMENT
A. Distinguishing Types of Implied Consent in
International Arbitration
Implied consent has long played a role in international commercial
arbitration, although it has occasionally been referred to under other169
names. When considering implied consent in class arbitration, one
must be careful not to overgeneralize to other types of implied consent.
For example, the doctrine that is developing in the class context is not
the same as that used to justify binding non-signatories to an arbitration
agreement.' 70 In the context of non-signatories, implied consent is used
to hold strangers to the arbitration agreement to its terms. Sometimes the
rationale is based on contract principles, as in cases involving agency,
assumption, and incorporation by reference, and sometimes the rationale
is based on equitable principles, as in the cases involving alter ego,
piercing the corporate veil, and estoppel.'
7
1
Although these cases can be used to suggest that implied consent is
an appropriate device in arbitration, they are not entirely on point. For
example, there is typically no need in class arbitration to substitute
167. Hanotiau, Groups of Companies, supra note 43, at 283 ("Whatever the stretch that
one is ready to give to the concept of consent .. . , one should not forget that consent is the
fundamental pillar of international arbitration.").
168. Indeed, in so doing, the problem of arbitrator partiality is diminished, since an arbi-
trator who acts surreptitiously in his or her own financial interest must nevertheless
demonstrate a facially neutral justification for proceeding on a classwide basis.
169. See, e.g., Hanotiau, Groups of Companies, supra note 43, at 287 (noting the "group
of companies" doctrine is based on the concept of implied consent). The term "implied con-
sent" was used explicitly in a recent international investment arbitration. Noble Energy, Inc. v.
The Republic of Ecuador (U.S.A. v. Ecuador), Prager DIGEST for Institute for Transnational
Arbitration (ITA) (ICSID 2008), available at http://www.kluwerarbitration.com, 19 (noting
"an implied consent to have the pending disputes arising from the same overall economic
transaction resolved in one and the same arbitration ... [elven though there is no express
language to this effect in the dispute resolution clauses").
170. See, e.g., Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 E3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.
1995) (outlining means of obtaining arbitral jurisdiction over non-signatories in a U.S. pro-
ceeding).
171. See, e.g., id.
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conduct or principles of estoppel for consent because all the parties to
the class arbitration have signed arbitration agreements with the defen-
dant.7 1 Instead, the situation with class arbitrations is more similar-but
not identical-to the type of implied consent used in consolidation cases.
In both instances, the "relevant question ... is what kind of arbitration
proceeding the parties agreed to. That question does not concern a state
statute or judicial procedures .... It concerns contract interpretation
and arbitration procedures."'' 3
However, class arbitration and consolidated arbitration are not just
similar in their emphasis on using implied consent to the type of proce-
dure that is to be adopted when explicit consent does not exist. They also
have certain structural similarities that have led courts and commentators
to equate the two proceedings. For example, in class arbitration, claim-
ants typically all have signed agreements with the defendant, but not
with each other. This is similar to certain types of consolidated arbitra-
tion, particularly those involving "vertical string" contracts in which
each party (say, in a construction arrangement) has a binding arbitration
agreement with at least one other party, but not with all others. 74 Consor-
tia arrangements are another type of business relationship that creates
contractual arrangements that are similar to the agreements associated
with class arbitrations, in that the general contractor in a consortium has
a single agreement with the hiring entity and then a web of agreements
with the other parties. 75 However, when courts and arbitrators look for
implied consent in consolidation agreements, they are not just looking
for consent to a particular type of proceeding-they also must determine
172. Should a situation arise where not all parties to a class arbitration have signed an
arbitration agreement, then the established modes of finding substituted consent can be used,
albeit with the understanding that special difficulties may arise as a result of the representative
nature of class arbitration. On the one hand, it could be said to be improper to hold unnamed
claimants to a private dispute resolution mechanism to which they have not agreed; on the
other hand, it could be said that it is unfair to disallow class arbitration when it is the only real
route to relief. See Lamm & Aqua, supra note 24, at 717-18 (discussing situations where the
commonality of facts is the sole link between members of a class, noting it is "impossible" to
obtain consent to arbitrate from all parties in such circumstances and concluding any "inter-
pretation of the law to prohibit consolidation absent the agreement of all parties effectively
bars the arbitration of class actions").
173. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003) (Breyer, J.) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d
85, 100 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (noting certain precedents "are
instructive insofar as they view the silence of an arbitration clause regarding consolidation,
joint hearings, and class arbitration as disclosing the parties' intent not to permit such proceed-
ings").
174. Hanotiau, Multiparty Arbitration, supra note 100, at 371; Platte, supra note 93, at
70, nn. 18-22.
175. Nicklisch, supra note 92, at 59-60.
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whether there is an acceptably direct line of contractual privity176 to as-
suage fears about strangers to the contract participating in the
arbitration.
77
Thus, reliance on precedents from the world of consolidated arbitra-
tion needs to be tempered in a class arbitration analysis so as to take into
account factors that are unique to consolidation. For example, parties in
a consolidated arbitration often have claims or counterclaims against
several parties to the proceedings, even against those who are considered
to be on their "own side.' 7' The existence of disputes among the claim-
ant and/or defendant group in consolidated arbitration gives rise to
concerns about both procedural fairness (in that parties are forced, for
example, to choose an arbitrator despite their divergent interests)' 79 and
efficiency (in that the proceedings will become increasingly complex,
with an ever-expanding range of costs, issues, and claims).'80
Critically, these issues do not present themselves in class arbitration
in the same way that they do in consolidated arbitration. Class proceed-
ings typically involve a much higher degree of factual and legal
similarity than consolidated actions do, such that members of the class
(or, in some of the more complex cases, each sub-class) are identically
situated as to each other and the defendant, and typically do not have
cross- or counterclaims against each other. 8 ' This limits the likelihood
176. Schwartz, supra note 94, at 343; Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry,
Negotiating Settlement of Disputes Provisions in International Business Contracts: Recent
Developments in Arbitration and Other Processes, 45 Bus. LAW. 577, 609 (1990).
177. Concerns about "strangers" to an arbitration often relate to issues involving confi-
dentiality. However, to the extent that the principle of confidentiality and privacy in arbitration
still exists, it could be overcome through reliance on the public interest exception. See supra
note 139; infra notes 330-339 and accompanying text; L. Yves Fortier, The Occasionally Un-
warranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 ARB. INT'L 131, 131, 139 (1999) (describing
instances wherein the principle of confidentiality may be breached); Richard C. Reuben, Con-
fidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1273 (2006) (noting
state and federal law fails to respect confidentiality in arbitration, at least in instances involv-
ing discovery or admissibility of evidence at trial).
178. In multi-party arbitration, parties may be teamed up into two "sides" for purposes
of naming arbitrators. This has led to disapproval of consolidation in some quarters based, in
part, on the fact that parties deemed to be on the same "side" may not have identical interests.
See infra notes 326-327 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
180. See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
181. Claimants in a class arbitration will also typically share factual arguments regarding
liability, though their positions may vary somewhat when it comes to the calculation of indi-
vidual damages. No factual differences should arise if the relief sought is declaratory or
injunctive in nature, since a remedy as to one is the same as the remedy to the others. FED. R.
Civ. P 23(b)(2). This could provide the basis of an argument that it is wrong to perceive of
class arbitration as a multi-party proceeding. Instead, class arbitration could be seen as a bilat-
eral procedure, with the named claimant on one side and the defendant on the other. However,
the difference is that the named class representative is permitted to deviate from the normal
rules of standing to seek remedies that will benefit similarly situated persons who are not
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that the kind of procedural unfairness that arises in consolidated arbitra-
tions will occur in class arbitrations. Efficiency concerns are also
eliminated, since all members of the class are pursuing identical legal
claims. ' Furthermore, members of the class may opt out of the arbitra-
tion if they have a concern about any aspect of the proceedings, be it
procedural unfairness, efficiency, or anything else.
83
As it turns out, it is typically the defendant who raises an objection
to the inclusion of the additional parties in class arbitrations. However,
the defendant usually does not do so on the grounds of inefficiency,
since a class proceeding is far more efficient and less costly from a de-
fendant's point of view than thousands of individual arbitrations.'
Instead, defendants object to the form of the proceeding for tactical rea-
185
sons.
Because class arbitrations are not entirely analogous with consoli-
dated arbitrations, an independent investigation into whether implied
consent can be used to overcome a presumption against class arbitration
parties to the proceeding per se. The question then is whether this approach would violate
international public policy (since representative actions are disfavored in many jurisdictions).
See supra note 157 and accompanying text. The answer might very well be "no," since objec-
tions based on public policy are construed narrowly and focus more on the risk of injustice to
the parties than on derogations to rules on standing. This argument is particularly persuasive in
cases where claimants seek declarative or injunctive relief, since the remedy as to one is the
same as to all. The author is indebted to Fr~ddric Bachand for identifying this particular point.
182. To the extent that certain aspects of the case may vary between claimants-such as
with the calculation of damages-the proceedings can be bifurcated.
183. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 6(b)(5); JAMS CLASS ARBITRA-
TION RULES, supra note 30, R. 4(5). The NAF Class Arbitration Procedures employ an opt-in,
rather than opt-out, approach, but the principle regarding claimant consent to the proceeding is
the same. NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 30, proc. B(5)(a). Class mem-
bers who are unhappy with any aspect of the proceedings---class counsel, class
representatives, the arbitrator(s) or the procedure chosen--can always choose to proceed indi-
vidually. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 87.
184. Defendants to class arbitration may have a legitimate objection to the manner in
which the arbitrators are named, if one views the issue from a strict constructionist viewpoint.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S.
444, 451 (2003) (Breyer, J.). However, the international arbitral community has discovered a
variety of ways to protect the principle underlying the right of selection of an arbitrator in
multi-party situations. See infra notes 342-344. It is considered below whether these interpre-
tive methods extend equally to class arbitration, even in cases where the defendant argues that
it has a contractual right to select a different arbitrator in each of a series of individual arbitra-
tions. Id.; see also Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450-51 (Breyer, J.).
185. See also In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 Ed 300, 321 (2d Cir. 2009), pet.
for cert. filed (08-1473) (May 29, 2009) (noting that the defendant planned to reconsider its
motion to compel arbitration after the court held a class waiver unenforceable). Defendants
prefer individual arbitrations because claimants are less likely to proceed individually, particu-
larly in low-value claims. Of course, the New York Convention does not require a party to
justify its claim that the letter of the arbitration agreement be upheld; instead, the presumption
is that arbitrators will and should comply with the expressed, permissible wishes of the parties
concerning matters of procedure. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d).
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in situations where the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous is
necessary. This issue will be discussed in the following section.
B. Implied Consent and Interpretive Rules in Class Arbitration
According to the United States Supreme Court, the quest for implied
consent in class arbitration relates to "what kind of arbitration proceed-
ing the parties agreed to," which "concerns contract interpretation and
arbitration procedures.' 86 In fact, the search for implied consent in class
arbitration uses the same kind of analytical approach that is used when
considering whether consolidation is proper in situations where the arbi-
tration agreement is silent or ambiguous.'87
Although the bulk of this discussion focuses on implied consent, it is
important to remember that arbitration is a contractual construct.'
Therefore, explicit consent will prevail over any implied terms, and
States will uphold party agreement regarding arbitral procedure so long
as the parties have not violated fundamental principles of due process,
public policy, or mandatory law.'89 Therefore, if the parties agree to class
arbitration, that agreement should be respected by enforcing courts.
An arbitration agreement may also explicitly forbid class treatment,
although the manner in which this prohibition is expressed can create
problems.' 90 Because corporate defendants strongly dislike class pro-
ceedings (both arbitral and judicial), some commentators believe that
class arbitration will soon disappear as a result of potential corporate
defendants' revising their arbitration agreements to include explicit
186. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53 (Breyer, J.).
187. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (noting that certain precedents "are instructive insofar as
they view the silence of an arbitration clause regarding consolidation, joint hearings, and class
arbitration as disclosing the parties' intent not to permit such proceedings").
188. See Craig, supra note 97, at 8; Stipanowich, supra note 91, at 476.
189. MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 50, at 283 (noting that parties can expressly agree
upon a procedure, but recognition of an award resulting from those procedures might be with-
held if "the term was so alien to English concepts of the nature of an arbitration as to
transform a process which the contract referred to as arbitration ... into something fundamen-
tally different"); Lamm & Aqua, supra note 24, at 716. The author has argued elsewhere that
class arbitrations seated in the United States will likely comply with international due process
and public policy. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 10, at 64-75. Although it is outside the scope
of this Article, it could be said that some claims-particularly those that are of small individ-
ual value-may only be remedied through class procedures, and that any such claims that are
brought to arbitration must proceed as a class as a matter of mandatory law. See Stemlight,
supra note 3, at 80-83, 100-05.
190. Although it is entirely possible that a court will uphold a waiver of class arbitration
(along with a waiver of class action), parties may contest waivers on the grounds of uncon-
scionability or other contractual defenses such as fraud or duress. Sternlight, supra note 3, at
105-08. Waivers of class treatment are hotly debated in both the courts and the scholarly lit-
erature, although they are outside the scope of this Article.
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prohibitions on class proceedings. Although this sort of defensive ac-
tion may decrease the number of class arbitrations that arise, it will not
totally eliminate such proceedings for the following reasons:
(1) Some defendants-particularly those from outside the United
States-may still be unaware of the risk of class arbitration
and thus will not take the necessary steps to avoid class pro-
ceedings;
(2) Some national laws or institutional rules may allow class arbi-
tration even over the objection of one or more of the parties;
and
(3) Courts may strike down attempted waivers of class arbitra-
tions as unconscionable, thus allowing arbitrators to
determine whether class treatment is warranted. 
92
Furthermore, at least one commentator has suggested that corporate de-
fendants might prefer to arbitrate class claims to avoid the extensive
discovery and costs that are associated with judicial class actions.'93
Other commentators believe that to the extent defendants find them-
selves forced into class proceedings, they would prefer to be in state
courts so that, among other things, they can appeal a decision on the
merits. 
194
Although some parties will explicitly consider the possibility of
class arbitration, the more common situation is that an arbitration
191. Id. at 117-19. But see Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 303 n.21
(claiming that class arbitration is increasing).
192. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 E3d 300, 310 n.7 (2d Cir. 2009),
pet. for cert. filed (08-1473) (May 29, 2009) (citing evidence that class arbitration is on the
rise). Explicit prohibitions on class arbitrations may be disallowed on the grounds of uncon-
scionability. See, e.g., Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 123-24 (N.J. 2006)
(Zazzali, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing circumstances in which a
prohibition on class arbitration might be unconscionable). Unconscionability and class waiv-
ers are hotly debated subjects right now, although they are outside the scope of this Article.
See Buckner, Due Process, supra note 30, at 230 (discussing problems associated with dual
court-arbitrator competence to decide certain issues); Smit, supra note 9, at 201 (discussing
legal status of waivers of class proceedings); Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 9, 75-76 (de-
scribing methods used by corporate defendants to avoid class arbitration); Weidemaier, supra
note 2, at 81-86 (discussing how defendants seek to avoid class proceedings in court or in
arbitration). If an arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitration, it is for the court-not the
arbitrator-to decide whether that prohibition is valid. In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554
F.3d at 310-11, pet. for cert. filed (08-1473) (May 29, 2009); Gipson v. Cross Country Bank,
354 F Supp. 2d 1278, 1287 (M.D. Ala. 2005).
193. Herzfeld, supra note 60, at 301. Alternatively, some corporate defendants may at-
tempt to draft clauses that refer any class proceedings to the court, rather than to arbitration.
194. Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 157.
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agreement will be silent or ambiguous regarding multi-party treatment.'95
Contractual silence or ambiguity creates a dilemma for a system that
founds itself on party autonomy. What default rules or presumptions
should apply?'96 What rules of construction should be used? Can class
arbitration be compelled absent explicit consent? 97 These questions are
even more compelling in the international realm, since lack of an inter-
nationally recognized form of consent can lead to lack of enforcement
under the New York Convention.' 98 Although Gary Born has explicitly
argued that the New York Convention's requirement of consent to a par-
ticular type of arbitration can be adequately met through implied
consent,"9 the issue is a novel one in the context of class arbitration.
Implied consent can be found through several means.'0 First, it can
be gleaned from the parties' arbitration agreement, either through the
scope of the language used in the arbitration agreement-which might
be broad and/or contemplate other types of multi-party proceedings-or
through extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions and expectations.2'
This approach is consistent with the interpretive method used within the
international arbitral community to handle so-called "pathological"
195. See HANOTIAU, supra note 98, 271 (discussing class arbitration); LEW ET AL.,
supra note 44, 16-51 (discussing consolidation); Joseph T. McLaughlin et al., Recent Devel-
opments in Domestic and International Arbitration Involving Issues of Arbitrability,
Consolidation of Claims and Discovery of Non-Parties, in SM909 ALI-ABA 757, 763-64
(March 2007) (discussing consolidation); Rau & Sherman, supra note 91, at 115 (discussing
consolidation).
196. Rau, supra note 43, at 221 (describing how default rules are chosen); see also supra
note 118 (regarding choice of default rules).
197. See, e.g., FRICK, supra note 95, at 237; Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra
note 6, at 312. Some courts and commentators have taken the view that permitting class arbi-
tration in cases where the arbitration agreement is silent would result in "considerably less
intrusion upon the contractual aspects of the relationship" than other alternatives. Sternlight,
supra note 3, at 86-87; Buckner, Pure Arbitral Paradigm, supra note 6, at 315; see also
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269,277-78 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rovner, J., concurring).
198. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1); see also LEW ET AL., supra note 44,
[ 16-3 to 16-4, n.4; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12, 3-82; Hanotiau, Problems, supra
note 91, at 303 (discussing consent in the context of interrelated contracts).
199. BORN, supra note 15, at 695 (discussing consolidation).
200. See Lamm & Aqua, supra note 24, at 720 (describing the analytic approach to con-
solidation and joinder issues).
201. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (noting "the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as
to issues of arbitrability"); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 100 (2d
Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (noting certain precedents "are instructive
insofar as they view the silence of an arbitration clause regarding consolidation, joint hearings,
and class arbitration as disclosing the parties' intent not to permit such proceedings"); Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. Can., 210 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
courts have no power to order consolidation if the contract does not authorize it, "[b]ut in
deciding whether the contract does authorize it the court may resort to the usual methods of
contract interpretation").
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clauses (i.e., agreements that are silent or ambiguous as to certain impor-
tant points of procedure, although clear as to the existence of a desire to
arbitrate any disputes between the parties). °2 One of the fundamental
interpretive principles in such cases is to "give full effect to the parties'
intention to refer their disputes to arbitration," which would permit mi-
nor amendments to agreed procedures to give voice to the parties'
overriding desire to resolve the dispute through arbitration rather than
litigation.203
Second, implied consent can be demonstrated through the parties'
choice of procedural rules and laws, some of which may include meth-
ods of dealing with multi-party situations. Such rules and laws may be
chosen explicitly or may apply as default provisions in the absence of
party choice.
Each of these two analytical approaches will be discussed in turn be-
low.
1. The Arbitration Agreement
Arbitrators are well within their powers and capabilities when they
construe silent or ambiguous arbitration agreements, ° typically through
202. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 476 (describing three basic principles of
interpretation in international commercial arbitration). Further discussion can be found in
Klaus Peter Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 17
ARB. INT'L 1, 17 (2001) (concluding "there is good hope that doctrine, courts and arbitral
tribunals alike will finally accept the international arbitrators' power to fill gaps and revise
contracts").
203. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 483. Alan Scott Rau has also posited an
interesting theory of consent and interpretation involving concentric circles radiating out from
the core concerns regarding consent. Rau, supra note 43, at 203. He argues that while strict
construction may make sense with respect to core issues such as whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate their disputes, it makes less sense the farther one moves from such fundamental ques-
tions. Id. at 203, 258. Instead, the farther away one is from the core issues, the more freedom
and deference one should give to arbitrators' decisions regarding their jurisdiction and the type
of procedure that should be followed. Id. This approach appears to have been adopted by
Germany in its new arbitration law. KARL-HEINZ BOCKSTIEGEL ET AL., ARBITRATION IN GER-
MANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 287 (2008) (noting that "[i]n contrast to the arbitration
agreement .... , the stipulation of procedural rules by the parties is not subject to a mandatory
form requirement; accordingly, oral agreements or agreements by implied consent ... are
possible").
204. Dealer Comp. Serv., Inc. v. DUB Herring Ford, 489 F. Supp. 2d 772, 781 (E.D.
Mich. 2007); Markel Int'l Ins. Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203
(D.N.J. 2006). As discussed previously, U.S. courts have said that arbitrators are competent to
decide these issues, so long as the parties have demonstrated the intent to give the issue to the
arbitrator. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003) (plurality opinion);
Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 100, cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009); Employers Ins. Co. of
Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443 F.3d 573, 576-81 (7th Cir. 2006); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc.
v. Nations Pets. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003). In the United States, that
question is often presumed to have been granted to the arbitrator. Rau, supra note 43, at 225.
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the application of normal principles of contract construction. When
considering whether the arbitration agreement permits a class proceed-
ing, the arbitrator takes a number of issues into account, such as whether
the agreement contemplated the possibility of other sorts of multi-party
proceedings and whether any applicable national laws or institutional
rules permit class or consolidated proceedings. 206 The language of the
arbitration agreement itself can also be indicative. For example, broadly
inclusive language requiring the arbitration of all "related disputes" can
result in a determination that class arbitration falls within the scope of an
arbitration agreement that is otherwise silent or ambiguous on the mat-
207ter. In some cases, extrinsic evidence regarding party intention or
expectation-as demonstrated by a prior course of dealing or by industry
custom and practice-may be permitted to help identify whether the par-
ties can be considered to have contemplated or agreed to class
S• 201
proceedings.
In some instances, the arbitrator will need to do no more than con-
sider the arbitration agreement. In other cases, however, arbitrators will
also need to consider the arbitration agreement in light of the applicable
national laws. The most important aspect of the national laws will be
those bearing on consolidated arbitrations and-if available-class arbi-
tration.
2. National Laws
Identifying the appropriate national laws can be a complicated mat-
ter in arbitration. Relevant laws can be implicated explicitly, through
contractual provisions regarding choice of law, or implicitly, through
provisions regarding the arbitral seat .2  Because the procedural law of
205. The precise principles used will depend on the jurisdiction whose law governs the
issue. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 99, cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (describ-
ing rules of construction in New York).
206. See Platte, supra note 93, nn. 15-16 (suggesting similar procedure in cases involv-
ing consolidation).
207. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 16-52; see also Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451-52 (plurality
opinion) (noting a broad arbitration clause indicates an arbitrator is to decide whether class
arbitration is indicated); Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 359 (same).
208. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 97-98, cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009)
(discussing industry custom in international maritime arbitration); Markel Int'l, 442 F. Supp.
2d at 205-06 (holding that the court could not consider prior course of dealing, since the mat-
ter should be decided by the arbitrator); Yuen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr 3d 127, 132 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004). -
209. Although parties may select the procedural law of a State other than the seat of the
arbitration, the law of the seat always retains some role in the proceedings. See Union of India
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48, 50-51 (Eng.) (distinguishing between
"internal" and "external" issues of procedural law); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12, 2-
11. Questions involving choice of governing law can become quite complex and are beyond
the scope of this Article. However, there is at least one way in which choice of law principles
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the seat always retains at least some residual role in an arbitration and
cannot be entirely eliminated from consideration even by the choice of
another State's procedural law, U.S. law will always apply to an arbitra-
tion seated in the United States, at least to some degree. 210
When considering national laws, arbitrators must take into account
the relevant statutory scheme, in addition to any relevant judicial inter-
pretations of that scheme.2 ' Furthermore, arbitrators need to know
whether a particular principle of law is considered mandatory or is sim-
ply a default rule, since no derogations from the former are permitted .
Parties need to exercise caution when relying on national default rules,
since those rules will be applied in appropriate circumstances regardless
of the extent to which the default provision deviates from expected
norms.. 213 Although the primary emphasis is of course on procedural law,
can simplify the analysis of arbitration agreements that are silent or ambiguous as to class
treatment. For example, if the arbitration agreement points strongly to seating the proceeding
in a jurisdiction (such as the U.S.) that recognizes arbitrators' authority to order classwide
proceedings, then the parties may be said to have implicitly consented to classwide proceed-
ings. By agreeing to arbitrate their disputes in that jurisdiction, they can be said to have chosen
all of that State's rules governing arbitration, even in cases where the parties did not subjec-
tively expect to be bound by those rules. See, e.g., infra note 213 (regarding an unusual default
provision in The Netherlands Arbitration Act). Although these types of provisions might be
considered "penalty default rules" (in that they adopt a position different than that expected
under "majoritarian default rules"), they are a legitimate tool in a legislator's or contracting
party's toolbox. See supra note 118 (regarding default mechanisms).
210. The question of whether state or federal law applies to any particular procedural or
substantive element of an international commercial arbitration is much debated and beyond
the scope of this Article. The issue is particularly thorny in matters involving class arbitration.
See, e.g., Gay v. CreditForm, 511 F.3d 369, 393-94, n.18 (3d Cir. 2007) (construing Pennsyl-
vania state law to be preempted by the FAA); Litman v. Cellco P'ship, No. 07-CV-4886, 2008
WL 4507573 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2008) (holding that the FAA preempts a New Jersey state rule
against class waivers in arbitration agreements); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 90
P.3d 586, 599 (Cal. 2008) (concluding, inter alia, that the FAA was not controlling in a state
appellate review of an arbitration award the under California Arbitration Act). For more on
this subject, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J.
393 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FederalArbitration].
211. Although civil law lawyers do not rely heavily on judicial precedent as a general
rule, international commercial arbitration is one area where an exception may be made, at
least among French courts and practitioners. See GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, T 151
(stating "French international arbitration law is thus currently drawn from two sources: a brief,
liberal Code of Civil Procedure, and well-established case law that is generally able to over-
come the Code's shortcomings... and to deal with difficulties of interpretation which may yet
arise").
212. Donovan & Greenawalt, supra note 125, T 1-4.
213. Irene M. Ten Cate, Multi-Party and Multi-Contract Arbitrations: Procedural
Mechanisms and Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements Under U.S. Law, 15 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 133, 140 n.41 (2004) (citing Sigvard Jarvin, Issues Relating to Consolidation, in
MULTI-PARTY ARBITRATION: VIEWS FROM INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SPECIALISTS 201,
202 (ICC ed., 1991)); see also Adam Samuel, Arbitration, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Generally and the European Convention on Human Rights: An Anglo-Centric View, 21 J.
INT'L ARB. 413, 416-19, 428 (2004) (noting that by choosing to arbitrate in the Netherlands,
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some attention must also be paid to any relevant substantive law, in case
it contains provisions that can explicitly or implicitly be said to permit or
require class or group proceedings.24
National laws can operate in tandem with the principle of effective
interpretation to permit slight deviations from party-agreed procedure so
as to give full effect to the overriding desire to arbitrate disputes. 2 " Thus,
for example, "if the arbitration law of the place of arbitration provides
for consolidation, consolidation ordered by a court of that jurisdiction is
likely to prevail over the parties' agreed method for appointing arbitra-
tors and conducting arbitral proceedings," at least so long as the parties
chose the location of arbitration.1 6
Currently, there are no known U.S. state or federal statutes that pro-
vide explicit guidelines on how or when a class arbitration is to
proceed.27 However, a number of U.S. states have recently enacted legis-
lation concerning the consolidation of arbitration, even though the FAA
parties are deemed to have chosen the default consolidation provision unless they choose
otherwise). Statutes that deviate dramatically from expected norms can create problems, par-
ticularly in international transactions. For example, Klaus Peter Berger has criticized the
consolidation provision of The Netherlands Arbitration Act, even though the Act gives the
parties the opportunity to contract out of the State's default provision, because "the parties,
coming from different jurisdictions and negotiating under heavy time pressure, will usually
not be aware of the consolidation provision of the new Act, let alone the possibility to opt out."
See Cate, supra, at 140 n.41 (quoting KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ARBITRATION 301 (1993)). There is some debate as to "the degree to which default rules can
be justified on the basis of consent by the parties," Drahozal, Federal Arbitration, supra note
210, at 414, but a detailed inquiry into that subject is beyond the scope of this discussion. This
Article takes the view that the parties are bound to any default rules that appear in the national
law deemed applicable by the arbitrator, if the parties have not addressed the issue themselves.
214. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 E3d 300, 311-20 (2d Cir. 2009),
pet. for cert. filed (08-1473) (May 29, 2009) (regarding federal antitrust claims in context of
other sorts of class proceedings); Stemlight, supra note 3, at 13-14, 63-65, 80-83 (discussing,
inter alia, Truth in Lending Act claims).
215. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 478; see also supra note 145 (describing the
principle of effective interpretation).
216. Leboulanger, supra note 91, at 68-69.
217. To date, only three state statutes seem to contemplate class arbitration. D.C. CODE
§ 16-4410 (2008) (noting that "that nothing in this part is intended to prevent a party's partici-
pation in a class action lawsuit or arbitration"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1880 (2008) (stating that
clauses that deny "the ability to consolidate arbitrations or to have arbitration for a class of
persons involving substantially similar issues. .. shall be closely reviewed for unconscionabil-
ity"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305 (West 2008) (noting arbitrators in uninsured motorist
cases may not proceed on a class basis). There are calls to amend the FAA to include provi-
sions requiring consumer, employment and franchise disputes to proceed in court, which
would limit the types of class arbitrations that could arise in the future. See, e.g., Arbitration
Fairness Act, H.R. 2010, 11 1st Cong. (2009). In the meantime, at least one commentator has
claimed that because "nothing in the FAA prohibits class arbitration .... it is allowed unless
clearly forbidden by the arbitration agreement applying governing state law." Thomas J. Oeh-
mke, Cause of Action for Class Arbitration of Contract-Based Disputes, 28 CAUSES OF
ACTION 2d § 10 (2008).
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is silent on the issue.' This increase in legislative consideration of con-
solidation is also reflected outside the United States, although the
majority of nations still take the view that consolidation may be ordered
only with the consent of both parties.29
The recent legislative changes in individual U.S. states are of par-
ticular importance for this Article because the interpretation of
arbitration agreements is typically a matter of state law in the United
States.2 20 As will be discussed, any statutory shift toward approval of
consolidation can by extension be construed as a shift toward approval of
class arbitration.2 ' This is true even if the statutes in question (which
were drafted pre-Bazzle)22 give courts-rather than arbitrators-the right
to consolidate proceedings, since courts' (but not arbitrators') ability to
consolidate arbitrations was traditionally suspect under the "lack of
power" argument.2 3 The fact that a number of states are now willing to
give this power even to judges demonstrates the growing legitimization
of multi-party arbitration. However, further adoption of such provisions
is not anticipated, since Bazzle and similar cases make it unlikely that
U.S. states will need to continue to adopt provisions giving courts the
power to consolidate arbitration, given that arbitrators now have the
218. Lamm & Aqua, supra note 24, at 721; Scanlon, supra note 50, nn.36-53; see infra
notes 225-235 and accompanying text.
219. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 16-66 to 16-68 (citing section 35 of the English Ar-
bitration Act 1996 as an example); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12, 3-82 to 3-85; Peter
Yuen, Arbitration Clauses in a Chinese Context, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 581, 590 (2007). The broad-
est grant of discretion concerning consolidation appears to exist in Australia, which permits
consolidation on the application of a single party on terms that would also appear to permit
class proceedings. International Arbitration Act 1974 § 24 (Austl.). Other pro-consolidation
jurisdictions include Hong Kong, The Netherlands, and New Zealand. Arbitration Ordinance
(2000) (H.K.) art. 6B, 2L, 2M; Arbitration Act 1986 (Neth.) art. 1046; Arbitration Act 1996
(New Zealand) arts. 6-7 & sch. 2; Cate, supra note 213, at 149, n.49; Hoellering, supra note
94, at 44; T6mas Kennedy-Grant, New Zealand, XXII Y.B. Com. ARB. 575, 578 (1997); Sam-
uel, supra note 212, at 427; Walter Sterling Surrey & Nancy J. Kellner, International
Arbitration in Hong Kong Law, 406 PLI/COM. 173, 183-84 (1986).
220. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Harvard Award, supra note 8, at 164. But see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
548 F.3d 85, 97-99 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009) (considering the
extent to which federal maritime law will affect contract interpretation); Oehmke, supra note
217, § 7 (noting "application of state law in determining the permissibility of class arbitration
must harmonize with the preemptive effect of the FAA").
221. Although it is true that many U.S. state statutes remain silent on the issue of con-
solidation, this nevertheless leaves the door for arbitrators to find implied consent through
other means.
222. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (plurality opinion).
223. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
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power to decide whether both class and consolidated proceedings are
appropriate. 4
Earlier, this Article noted that class arbitration and consolidation dif-
fer in several significant ways. This distinction was made to avoid
improper blanket analogies being drawn between the two types of pro-
cedures, although it was stated that some parallels might be appropriate.
For example, it would appear permissible for arbitrators to look to stat-
utes increasing the availability of consolidation when considering the
propriety of class arbitration in situations where the agreement is silent
or ambiguous as to class treatment, since both deal with the availability
of multi-party arbitration. Furthermore, the expansion of a less socially
beneficial arbitral device (i.e., consolidation) suggests the propriety of an
equally liberal attitude toward a more socially beneficial arbitral device
(i.e., class procedures). This is particularly true in circumstances where
the statutes give the power of consolidation to judges, a less jurispruden-
tially sound approach than the grant to arbitrators of the power to order
class arbitration.
To date, six state statutes appear to require unanimous consentS • 221
among the parties to consolidation, which will, for reasons discussed
below, limit some arguments in those jurisdictions that class arbitration
is permitted over the objection of a party. However, other U.S. states al-
low a court to consolidate arbitrations on the request of a single party,
unless the parties have agreed otherwise, effectively creating a default
rule in favor of consolidation.2 28 The shift is primarily the result of the
224. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co., 489 E3d 580, 588-89 (3d Cir. 2007); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations Pers. of
Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
225. See supra notes 90-116 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 116-166 and accompanying text (regarding the social benefit of
class arbitration).
227. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.272 (West 2008) (permitting consolidation
when the court deems it "just and necessary" in international commercial arbitrations); FLA.
STAT. § 684.12 (2008) (permitting consolidation when it "will serve the interests of justice and
the expeditious resolution of the disputes"); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-567.57 (West 2008)
(concerning international commercial arbitration; permitting consolidation when the court
deems it "just and necessary"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2712.52 (West 2008) (permitting
consolidation when the court deems it "just and necessary"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.506
(West 2008) (permitting consolidation when the court deems it "just and necessary"); TEx.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.173 (West 2008) (permitting consolidation in interna-
tional commercial arbitrations when the court deems it "just and necessary"); see also LEW ET
AL., supra note 44, IN 16-67 to 16-73 (discussing English, U.S., Australian, Dutch, Hong
Kong, and Swiss provisions); Cate, supra note 213, at 140, n.49; Richard Jeydel, Consolida-
tion, Joinder and Class Actions, 57 Disp. REs. J. 24, 24 (2002); Leboulanger, supra note 91, at
58; Shamoon & Cate, supra note 91, at 351-57.
228. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-6 (West 2008) (requiring the same or related transactions
and common issues of law or fact that would create "the possibility of conflicting rulings," but
granting such powers "unless the parties agree otherwise").
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U.S. Revised Uniform Arbitration Act 2000 (RUAA),229 which has been
adopted in eleven states and the District of Columbia.3 The language
used in the RUAA and in the various jurisdictions adopting it is expan-
sive with respect to the ability to consolidate arbitrations, stating:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), upon [motion]
of a party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an arbitration pro-
ceeding, the court may order consolidation of separate
arbitration proceedings as to all or some of the claims if:
(1) there are separate agreements to arbitrate or separate arbi-
tration proceedings between the same persons or one of
them is a party to a separate agreement to arbitrate or a
separate arbitration proceeding with a third person;
(2) the claims subject to the agreements to arbitrate arise in
substantial part from the same transaction or series of re-
lated transactions;
(3) the existence of a common issue of law or fact creates the
possibility of conflicting decisions in the separate arbitra-
tion proceedings; and
(4) prejudice resulting from a failure to consolidate is not
outweighed by the risk of undue delay or prejudice to the
rights of or hardship to parties opposing consolidation.
(b) The court may order consolidation of separate arbitration pro-
ceedings as to some claims and allow other claims to be
resolved in separate arbitration proceedings.
229. National Conference of Commissioners on State Law, Uniform Arbitration Act
(Final Act 2000, § 10(a)), available at http://www.law.upenn.edubll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm#uaa
(last visited June 30, 2009) [hereinafter RUAA]. Consolidation under the RUAA appears to be
a "'procedural issue' unlikely to be preempted by the FAA." Drahozal, Federal Arbitration,
supra note 210, at 422.
230. ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.370 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-210 (2008); D.C.
CODE § 16-4410 (noting that "that nothing in this section is intended to prevent a party's par-
ticipation in a class action lawsuit or arbitration," suggesting that class arbitration is
legislatively contemplated); HAW. REV. STAT. 658A-10 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 38.224
(West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:23B-10 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 I (West
2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-569-10 (West 2008) (relating only to domestic arbitrations,
in that international commercial arbitrations seated in North Carolina are covered by N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-567-57 (West 2008), which does not require consent); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-29.3-10 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1861 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-111
(West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.04A.100 (West 2008); Uniform Law Commissioners, A
Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), available at http://www.nccusl.org/
Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited June 24, 2009).
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(c) The court may not order consolidation of the claims of a party
to an agreement to arbitrate if the agreement prohibits con-
solidation . 3
Thus, under the RUAA, arbitration agreements that are silent or am-
biguous as to consolidation can be construed to permit such
proceedings.2 Furthermore, courts construing the RUAA can give par-
ties the right "to prove that consolidation would undermine their stated
expectations, especially regarding arbitrator selection procedures," and
to weigh potential prejudice (such as undue delay or other hardships) to
parties if consolidation is or is not ordered, which provides objecting
parties with an opportunity to make a wide variety of arguments as to
23
why multi-party proceedings should not be adopted 3. Notably, these
types of considerations are the same as those that arbitrators consider
when deciding whether class arbitration is permitted as a matter of con-
tract construction and whether class proceedings are appropriate under
the circumstances at hand. 34 Thus the liberalization of consolidation
seems to parallel the development of class arbitration, and vice versa.
Two U.S. jurisdictions go even further than the standards enunciated
in the RUAA. Massachusetts takes the unusual approach of permitting
judicial consolidation of arbitrations, even when the language in the arbi-
tration agreement explicitly bars consolidation and even when the
language in the arbitration agreement attempts to divest the court of its
power to order judicial consolidation.2 ' Guam also grants the courts
broad powers to order consolidation, even if the arbitration agreements
are in some ways inconsistent, so long as the disputes are from the same
or related transactions and there are common issues of law or fact that
could lead to inconsistent rulings.236
231. RUAA, supra note 229, art. 10.
232. Id., art. 10(c). But see id. § 10 cmts. 1-5 (claiming section 10 of the RUAA "is not
intended to address the issue as to the validity of arbitration clauses in the context of class-
wide disputes") (emphasis added). Of course, questions of validity of an arbitration agreement
are different from questions of scope.
233. Id. § 10 cmts. 1-5.
234. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, Rs. 3-4; JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 30, Rs. 2-3.
235. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 251, § 2A (West 2008) (permitting consolidation if the
agreements have the same method of appointing arbitrators and noting "[n]o provision in any
arbitration agreement shall bar or prevent action by the court under this section").
236. GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 42A203 (2008). The Guam statute appears identical to
California's domestic arbitration statute, which also permits consolidation over the objection
of a party. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 1281.3 (West 2008); cf id. § 1297.272 (West 2008) (re-
garding international commercial arbitration).
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The recent legislative activity suggests a significant shift in U.S. ju-
risprudence over the last ten years.237 The RUAA creates a presumption
in favor of consolidation in situations where the parties have not explic-
itly addressed multi-party arbitration. In Georgia and the twelve RUAA
jurisdictions-and certainly in Massachusetts and Guam-an arbitration
agreement that is silent on group treatment will support such treatment if
the necessary elements exist. Although the legislation grants powers to
courts, rather than arbitrators, and deals with consolidations, rather than
class arbitrations, the presumption in favor of consolidating arbitrations
also benefits proponents of class arbitration, since there are fewer policy
reasons to restrict the incidence of class arbitrations than there are with
respect to consolidated arbitrations. 2 8 Furthermore, the fact that an arbi-
trator's ruling is supported by legislation that establishes a default
position in favor of group treatment in cases where the arbitration
agreement is silent or ambiguous adds legitimacy to a class award when
it comes time to seek international enforcement.
Despite the above, over thirty U.S. state statutes remain silent on the
question of arbitral consolidation. What rule should be applied in these
jurisdictions?2 19
At one time, it was not uncommon for a U.S. court to order consoli-
dation on the application of one of the parties, even in the absence of any
enabling legislation. 24 0 That trend reversed as courts began adopting the
view that they lacked the authority to consolidate arbitrations absent
party consent (express or implied), and a split in both federal and state
241
authority arose.
237. See S.I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration:
An Infringement of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 10 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 915, 936-40 (1998) (discussing availability of consolidation in 1998).
238. See supra notes 116-166 and accompanying text.
239. Some of the following arguments can also be made in the six states that require
unanimous consent among the parties prior to judicial consolidation, although the moving
party will have to address the fact that the state legislature has taken a restrictive view of man-
datory multi-party proceedings, at least when the decision to consolidate is to be made by a
court. See supra note 227.
240. McLaughlin et al., supra note 195, at 767-68 (describing split in approach in U.S.
states without statutory consolidation provisions); Platte, supra note 93, n.17. For a summary
of U.S. state and federal jurisprudence, see BORN, supra note 15, 695-700.
241. See Cate, supra note 213, at 150-51; Hoellering, supra note 94, at 44-45; Lamm &
Aqua, supra note 24, at 716-17 (listing cases and noting split regarding propriety of consoli-
dation); Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 176, at 609-09 n. 168; McLaughlin et al.,
supra note 195, at 764 (noting federal circuits are split on the propriety of court-ordered con-
solidation, with a substantial majority holding that it is improper). The Seventh Circuit seems
to be the exception to the rule, and instead appears to have recently adopted a form of implied
consent to arbitration. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. Can., 210 F3d 771 (7th
Cir. 2000) (noting that "the court has no power to order such consolidation if the parties' con-
tract does not authorize it. But in deciding whether the contract does authorize it the court may
resort to the usual methods of contract interpretation, just as courts do in interpreting other
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Much of this earlier jurisprudence may no longer be applicable, for
two reasons. First, some of the older case law arose in jurisdictions that
had no legislative default provision permitting consolidation in situations
where the arbitration agreement was silent. The recent pro-consolidation
provisions will supersede the older common law rules in those jurisdic-
tions that have enacted relevant legislation and provide a basis for parties
to argue that the trend is moving away from a restrictive view of multi-
party arbitration. Second, a growing number of courts have ruled that the
arbitrator, rather than the court, should decide the question of consolida-
• 242
tion. Thus, the older precedents on consolidation may no longer be
controlling or even persuasive, even in consolidation decisions, since
they rely on the now discredited "lack of judicial power" argument.243
Therefore, jurisdictions that have not enacted legislation on the con-
solidation of arbitration should consider questions about implied consent
to class arbitration as open. In these jurisdictions, arbitrators who are
asked to construe whether arbitration agreements that are silent or am-
biguous can support class treatment should rely on basic principles of
contract construction, as is the norm in international arbitration.' 44 In so
doing, arbitrators should keep the principle of effective interpretation
firmly in mind, as well as the public policies in favor of class treat-
ment.2 5 Such an approach will likely lead to results that are consistent
with those from states that have consolidation statutes.2 6 Furthermore,
provisions in an arbitration clause" and concluding that "textual and practical considerations"
weighed in favor of consolidation in the case at bar). But see Rolls-Royce Indus. Power, Inc. v.
Zurn EPC Servs., Inc., No. 01.C.5608, 2001 WL 1397881 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 07, 2001) (distin-
guishing Connecticut General on the grounds that that case "involved a single agreement
whereas this case and the other circuit court cases cited above involved multiple agreements.
Petitioner has cited to no case-and we have found none-holding that the parties impliedly
consented to consolidated arbitration where there were two separate arbitration agreements
with different parties signing each agreement").
242. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003) (plurality opinion);
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
77 U.S.L.W. 3678 (2009); Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443 F.3d
573, 576-81 (7th Cir. 2006); Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d
355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003); Shaw's Supermarkets Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, Local 791, 321 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2003); McLaughlin et al., supra note 195, at 764.
243. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 186-203 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
246. Although consistency between different jurisdictions is not a goal of U.S. law or
arbitral practice, confusion and unpredictability in arbitral law can injure international com-
merce and lead to foreign parties' refusal or disinclination to conduct business with U.S.
parties or permit arbitrations to proceed on U.S. soil. See infra notes 255-260 (regarding pos-
sible anti-U.S. sentiment in international arbitration if a doctrine of implied consent is
improperly developed). Therefore, courts and arbitrators should be aware of the larger ramifi-
cations of their individual decisions. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation
Different?, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1297, 1379-80 (2004) (arguing that those involved in
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even if an arbitrator cannot take advantage of any legislative default pro-
visions to help guide his or her analysis in one direction or another, he or
she can consider the extent to which pro-consolidation legislation is on
the rise, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, since evidence that the law on
consolidation is undergoing a liberalizing trend would suggest that class
arbitration could be well received internationally. 2'
3. Arbitral Rules
Parties may choose to have the rules of an arbitral institution apply
to their proceedings by adopting those rules in their arbitration agree-
248ment. If any such rules apply, their provisions are incorporated into the
arbitration agreement and the parties are said to have demonstrated im-
plied consent to the terms of the rules. Thus, an arbitrator who is asked
to decide whether an arbitration agreement supports class treatment must
consider the provisions contained in any arbitral rules that have been
adopted by the parties.
a. Specialized Rules on Class Arbitration
At this point in time, three different arbitral institutions have pub-
lished rules outlining how class arbitrations are to proceed.2 49 Although
each of the three rule sets describes how the arbitrator is to determine the
secondary issue of whether the claim in question should proceed as a
class, none of the rule sets indicates how the arbitrator is to construe
the arbitration clause to determine whether the agreement supports class
treatment, other than to say that the existence of the specialized rules
should not be used as evidence that the parties consented to class arbitra-
tion. 5 Since this Article focuses on the question of how an agreement
transnational dispute resolution should be aware of the international ramifications of their
decisions).
247. Arbitrators must always take care regarding new developments in arbitral law and
procedure, since some commentators have argued that arbitrators have a duty to produce an
enforceable award. GUnther J. Horvath, The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable
Award, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 135, 135 (2001); Platte, supra note 93, at 307.
248. C&L Enter., Inc., v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 419 n.1
(2001); Lockman v. J.K. Harris & Co., No. 3:06-CV-258-H, 2007 WL 734951, at *2 (W.D.
Ky. 2007).
249. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30; JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 30; NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 30.
250. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 4; JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 30, R. 3; NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 30, proc. A.
251. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 3; JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION
RULES, supra note 30, R. 2; NAF CLASS ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 30, preface.
The NAF Class Arbitration Procedures have been construed to disallow consolidation over the
objection of a party and thus, by extension, class arbitration over the objection of a party.
Lockman, 2007 WL 734951, at *2, n.l; Taylor v. First N. Am. Nat'l Bank, 325 F. Supp. 2d
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that is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment is to be construed, it
would initially appear as if the specialized rules on class arbitration are
irrelevant to this discussion.
However, two of the rule sets contain triggering mechanisms that can
have some impact on the subject of this Article. Both provisions require
the application of the specialized rule sets even in situations where the
parties have not necessarily contemplated the possibility of class arbitra-
tion. For example, Rule 1(1) of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) Supplementary Rules states:
These Supplementary Rules ... shall apply to any dispute aris-
ing out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to
any of the rules of the American Arbitration Association ...
where a party submits a dispute to arbitration on behalf of or
against a class or purported class, and shall supplement any
other applicable AAA rules.252
The JAMS Class Arbitration Rules contain a similar provision.
253
In some ways, this language appears to uphold the autonomy of par-
ties by only applying the specialty rules to those who have been deemed
to accept them through their adoption of that arbitral institution's non-
class arbitration rules. However, these provisions apply the concept of
implied consent to allow retroactive application of the specialty rules to
parties who never contemplated class arbitration. This could come as a
surprise to some parties, many of whom would not expect to have sub-
jected themselves to a mode of dispute resolution that was not even in
existence when they signed their arbitration agreements or that does not
have a ready analogue in many national judicial systems. It also places a
significant burden on parties who want to protect themselves against the
possibility of class arbitration under one of these rule sets to research
older contracts to find out whether they utilized one of JAMS or the
AAA's many rules of arbitration at any point in the past.
255
1304, 1317 n.23 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (construing Rule 19(a) of the National Arbitration Forum's
Code of Procedure).
252. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 1(1).
253. JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, R. 1 (a).
254. For example, if parties included a AAA arbitration clause in a contract dating back
to the 1970s or 1980s, they still will be held to have agreed to class arbitration under the AAA
Supplementary Rules if they have not subsequently updated their agreement to indicate other-
wise. Although it is considered a "best practice" to review and update old arbitration
agreements to take into account any changes in law or circumstance, few parties actively do
so.
255. Since its inception in 1926, the AAA has promulgated a large number of rules for
arbitration, ranging from commercial arbitration rules (including large, complex commercial
disputes) and international arbitration rules to commercial finance arbitration rules, construc-
tion arbitration rules, energy arbitration rules, employment arbitration rules, healthcare
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This aspect of the AAA Supplementary Rules and the JAMS Class
Arbitration Rules raises one of the major pitfalls associated with implied
consent: the potential for surprise to the parties. Opponents to non-
consensual class arbitration will note-correctly-that international
commercial arbitration developed as a means of allowing businesses to
structure their dispute resolution processes in an orderly manner pre-
cisely so that they could avoid surprise.256 Broad and indiscriminate
development of a doctrine of implied consent or an interpretive rule
permitting class arbitration as a default presumption could result in sur-
prise to the parties and diminish parties' and States' belief in and support
of arbitration as a reliable, predictable, and party-controlled dispute reso-
lution mechanism. While widespread abandonment of arbitration may be
unlikely in the international realm-since the difficulties associated with
international enforcement of civil judgments and concern about the bias
of state courts make parties unwilling to resort to judicial means of dis-
pute resolution-those who support putting class arbitration on an equal
standing with bilateral arbitration still must be cautious about how class
arbitration develops.
Furthermore, problems can arise if implied consent and any related
interpretive rules are used inconsistently in different jurisdictions. One of
the primary motivating factors behind recent efforts to standardize inter-
national arbitral norms has been to increase parties' ability to predict
how their disputes might be decided, regardless of where the arbitration
is seated or where enforcement is sought.257 Research suggests that those
nations that conform to international standards experience an increase
both in international commerce and the incidence of arbitrations seated
in the jurisdiction."' Encouraging or permitting the development of pro-
cedures that deviate significantly from established international norms
could have the opposite effect.
For example, parties from nations that adopt a broad doctrine of im-
plied consent or that use interpretive rules that do not conform to
international practice could find it increasingly difficult or expensive to
arbitration rules, consumer arbitration rules and so on. See AAA, http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=28751 (last visited June 24, 2009). JAMS offers fewer options but is nevertheless
active in several different fields of law. See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND
PROCEDURES (2007), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/comprehensive.asp (last vis-
ited June 24, 2009). It is impossible to know how many parties have adopted one of the AAA
or JAMS arbitration rules over the last eighty-plus years, but the number is vast, particularly
given that the AAA has recently claimed that it is "the largest international commercial arbitral
institution in the world." Drahozal, New Experiences, supra note 6, at 233.
256. See BORN, supra note 15, at 2 (describing the development of international com-
mercial arbitration).
257. See Park & Yanos, supra note 14, at 276-77.
258. See BORN, supra note 15, at 29-30; Park & Yanos, supra note 14, at 276-77.
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engage in international commerce. Foreign entities might refuse to enter
into business transactions with those whose home jurisdictions take an
expansive view of implied consent, based on a fear of finding themselves
subject to a different type of arbitration than they had anticipated.2 59 Al-
ternatively, foreign entities might be willing to do business with parties
whose courts or arbitrators use implied consent freely, but only after im-
posing higher transaction costs on the parties from that jurisdiction.
Neither option is attractive, particularly since international arbitration is
intended to facilitate international commerce, not hinder it. While parties
from nations that adopt a broad doctrine of implied consent or unusual
interpretive methods might include provisions in their arbitration agree-
ments that attempt to limit the applicability of such provisions, such
efforts might not be enough to assuage the fears of foreign parties.
Furthermore, parties from nations that adopt a broad doctrine of im-
plied consent or that use interpretive rules that do not conform to
international practice could experience limitations on the way in which
the parties structure their arbitrations. For example, foreign parties might
refuse to seat an arbitration in a nation that resorts frequently to implied
consent or whose interpretive methods are internationally suspect. Simi-
larly, foreign parties might refuse to have the substance or procedure of
an arbitration governed by the law of a State that permits the broad use
of implied consent in the construction of an arbitration agreement. In
both cases, the party that is from the disfavored nation loses the benefits
associated with having a "home court" or home law advantage. Further-
more, the harm may not be limited to the party from the nation with the
broad doctrine of implied consent. If that jurisdiction's substantive and
259. The fear is based on the belief that the nation that utilizes implied consent freely
might assert jurisdiction over the arbitration. Although the greatest danger is in cases where
the law incorporating broad notions of implied consent properly influences arbitral procedure,
see supra notes 207-214 and accompanying text, business parties might also worry that those
States' laws will mistakenly be applied by an arbitrator or court.
260. While parties could attempt to contract around problematic principles of national
law through the use of carve-outs, doing so can be a complex undertaking. Furthermore, if the
law is mandatory in nature-as some laws relating to the use of class mechanisms may be-
the parties will be unable to prohibit the application of the law. Notably, the concern about the
application of relevant law extends to both procedural and substantive choice of law. While
choices of procedural law are obviously relevant-since class arbitration is considered a pro-
cedural mechanism-the choice of substantive law can also result in class arbitration, if the
arbitrator determines that the aim of that substantive law cannot be effectuated in a non-class
proceeding. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 554 E3d 300, 311-20 (2d Cir. 2009),
pet. for cert. filed (08-1473) (May 29, 2009) (regarding federal antitrust claims in the context
of other sorts of class proceedings); Stemlight, supra note 3, at 13-14, 63-65, 80-83 (discuss-
ing, inter alia, Truth in Lending Act claims).
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procedural law is otherwise favorable to arbitration of the dispute, both
parties may suffer injury. 16
In both of these possible scenarios, the international backlash has
both the intent and effect of isolating the State whose approach to arbi-
tration deviates from the international norm, although the injury is felt
by individual parties.262 The impact also trickles down to consumers, who
ultimately bear the burden of increased transaction costs imposed on the
commercial actors. The question, therefore, is whether class arbitration
constitutes an objectionable amount or type of surprise. As it turns out, it
does not. Instead, the following discussion demonstrates that interna-
tional actors are both (1) on notice that class arbitration is a possible
form of dispute resolution, both in the United States and elsewhere; and
(2) the type of implied consent and interpretive rules that are used in
class arbitration cases conform with the principles and practices that
have been applied in international arbitration for years.
i. The International Arbitral Community Is on Notice
Regarding Class Arbitration
Although class arbitration may have only recently become an inter-
national dispute resolution device, the procedure itself has been in
existence domestically for years. Class arbitration first appeared in the
United States in 1982, shooting to national and international prominence
in 2003 with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bazzle.263 Class arbitra-
tion was also judicially contemplated in Canada and Colombia as early
as 2002, although the procedure may have existed before then and sim-
ply not been reported in international arbitral materials.
6'
Specialized rules concerning class procedure in arbitration were also
published by some of the best-known arbitral institutions in the world in
261. While some may claim that parties to international arbitration have always had the
option of choosing neutral substantive laws and procedural seats, the loss of an otherwise
viable option still has its costs.
262. This is the reverse of liberalizing laws that are meant to bring countries into closer
conformity with international standards. See BORN, supra note 15, at 29-30; Christopher R.
Drahozal, Regulatory Competition and the Location of International Arbitration Proceedings,
24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 371, 372-74 (2004) (presenting empirical evidence suggesting that
the number of arbitrations in a given country increases on the enactment of a new or revised
arbitration law); William W. Park, The International Currency of Arbitral Awards, 770
PLULIT 359, 387 (2008) (noting how nations with unusual arbitration laws can suffer a "com-
petitive disadvantage" when compared to jurisdictions that follow international norms).
263. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion); Keating v.
Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
264. See, e.g., Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2005] Q.C.C.A. 570,
rev'd 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.); Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc., [2002] 58 O.R.3d 299 (Can.) (origi-
nally reported in 2002); Valencia, supra note 53 (initially reported in 2003).
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2003.265 Even if one takes the year 2003 (rather than the year 1982) as
the date most realistically calculated to put the international arbitral
community on notice about the possibility of this type of procedure,
enough time has passed to ensure that surprise is no longer an issue. Par-
ties who are currently drafting arbitration agreements have more than
enough information on how to avoid class arbitration if they wish, and
parties to older arbitration clauses have had time to research and amend
existing language so as to forestall the possibility of class arbitration, if
so desired.266
Skeptics might argue that a scarcity of jurisprudence concerning the
transnational implications of class arbitration means that surprise is still
a possibility outside the United States, but the procedure has been dis-
cussed by international scholars for years.267 Furthermore, numerous
workshops and seminars on class arbitration have been offered at both
the domestic and international level for some time. Finally, it has long
been agreed that parties and their counsel carry the burden of taking the
appropriate steps to keep current with the state of the law in the countries
in which they do business. 268 Thus, there do not seem to be sufficient
grounds to argue that class proceedings give rise to a cognizable claim of
surprise.
This is true even with respect to the arguably retroactive application
of the AAA Supplementary Rules and the JAMS Class Arbitration
Rules. 269 Actors in the international arbitration community are or should
be aware that arbitral institutions change their rules with some fre-
quency.2 70 Furthermore, it has always been the case that if a party wishes
265. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30.
266. The literature is full of guidance on how potential defendants can avoid the risk of
class arbitration. See, e.g., Lacovara, supra note 113, at 558-59 (encouraging companies to
create variations in arbitration agreements); Scanlon, supra note 50, at 44 (advising companies
on how to avoid class arbitration).
267. See, e.g., HANOTIAU, supra note 98, at 257-310; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
12, 2-91; Bernard Hanotiau, A New Development in Complex Multiparty-Multicontract Pro-
ceedings: Classwide Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT'L 39 passim (2004); Lacovara, supra note 113,
passim.
268. Christopher William Pappas, Comparative U.S. & EU Approaches to E-Commerce
Regulation: Jurisdiction, Electronic Contracts, Electronic Signatures and Taxation, 31 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 325, 326 (2002).
269. Again, the mere existence of the specialized rules will not affect the determination
of whether class arbitration is permitted under the agreement. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES,
supra note 30, R. 1(1); JAMS CLASS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 30, R. 1(a).
270. Even if a party could have asserted surprise in 2003 or 2004, that argument no
longer appears possible. Indeed, at this point, there does not seem to be any international party
who is claiming surprise as a result of an international class arbitration filed soon after the
major developments of 2003. Since the legitimacy of any claim of surprise diminishes as time
passes, the question of whether a party could have claimed surprise in 2003 or 2004 will not
be addressed herein.
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to be held to rules that were in existence at the time the agreement was
signed, it may do so by expressing that desire in the arbitration agree-
ment. In the absence of any such indication, the arbitrator is entitled to
decide that a reference to a particular rule set should be construed to
mean the rules that are in effect at the time the dispute arises." '
ii. Implied Consent as a Rule of Interpretation
This Article has discussed the use of implied consent in explicit
terms as a means of focusing the inquiry on whether the decision to
permit class arbitration in situations where the arbitration agreement is
silent or ambiguous as to multi-party treatment can meet arbitration's
fundamental requirement of consent. This Article has also used the term
advisedly, taking care to distinguish consent to a particular procedure
from consent to arbitration itself.
272
However, in many ways, implied consent in the context of class arbi-
tration refers more to an interpretive method than it does to the
application of a doctrinal mechanism to supplant party autonomy.
2 73
Thus, for example, the principle of effective interpretation can be seen as
a device by which the parties give their implied consent to any procedure
by which arbitration may be effectively instituted.2 74 Similarly, the inter-
pretive method used by arbitrators to discern whether an arbitration
agreement that is silent or ambiguous as to class treatment will permit a
class proceeding is no more intrusive than the methods used to give
meaning to more traditional pathological clauses.275
Therefore, the preceding discussion suggests that the principles that
arbitrators in U.S.-based arbitrations rely on when construing arbitration
agreements conform with longstanding and internationally accepted in-
terpretive practices. 76 Even if parties who object to international class
arbitration can claim subjective surprise, no objective surprise exists,
since the parties were on notice that arbitrators in U.S.-based proceed-
ings will apply this type of interpretive methodology. Thus, the
mechanism by which the specialized rule sets on class arbitration can be
applied meets international standards.
271. Michael A. Geibelson & Bernice Conn, Clause and Effect, 29 L.A. LAw. 35, 40-41
(2006).
272. For example, implied consent lies at the heart of the various means of bringing non-
signatories into an arbitration, a practice that has been in use for decades. See supra note 99
and accompanying text.
273. See Rau, supra note 43, at 224 (describing instances in which arbitrators cease to
interpret agreements and noting that that is the point at which they exceed their authority); id.
at 240 (noting importance of focusing inquiry on assent).
274. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
275. See id.
276. See supra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
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b. General Arbitral Rules
There is no requirement that arbitrations seated in the United States
must adopt the rules of a U.S.-based arbitral institution or indeed any
arbitral rules whatsoever. Instead, arbitrations seated in the United States
may adopt the rules of any arbitral institution that they wish or may pro-
ceed on a completely ad hoc basis.2 " If parties to a purported class
arbitration choose to proceed ad hoc, then there is no need to conduct an
analysis under this heading.278 However, many international parties do, in
fact, choose to adopt institutional rules, even if the arbitration is not for-
mally administered by that institution.
No set of general arbitral rules indicates the circumstances in which
class arbitration can be ordered, nor does any set of rules give arbitrators
any detailed guidelines on how they are to construe an arbitration
agreement in situations involving multiple parties. Instead, the rules
leave it open for the arbitrators to decide the appropriate principles of
construction through reliance on general principles of contract law, as
dictated by the relevant state law.279 However, it appears that a number of
the leading international arbitral rule sets include general language about
multi-party arbitration that can be extended to class arbitration.
2 8 0
For example, the Swiss Rules of Arbitration (Swiss Rules) allow
consolidation of proceedings, both in cases where the parties are identi-
cal (i.e., multiple proceedings between the same parties) and in cases
where the parties are not identical.28' Although consultation with the par-
ties is required, the decision to consolidate can be made even over the
277. There is no restriction on the types of rules that may be chosen, so long as the re-
sulting procedure resembles arbitration in fundamental regards. MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note
50, at 283.
278. Of course, arbitrators looking for persuasive authority may consider whether any
sort of international consensus or trend is reflected in various arbitral rules.
279. Choice of law issues in international arbitration can be very complex. An arbitration
seated in the United States may not necessarily be governed entirely by U.S. procedural or
substantive law, though U.S. law will retain some relevance. See Union of India v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 48, 50-51 (Eng.) (distinguishing between "internal"
and "external" issues of procedural law); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 11, 2-11. Further
discussion of this issue is unfortunately outside the scope of this Article.
280. The inclusion of provisions on multi-party proceedings is not universal. For exam-
ple, two of the most often used AAA rules-those concerning international matters and those
concerning commercial matters (including large, complex disputes)--do not mention consoli-
dation or multi-party proceedings. See AAA Home Page, http://www.adr.org/ (last visited July
12, 2009). Furthermore, some rules contain restrictions on multi-party proceedings that pro-
ponents of class arbitration would find difficult to overcome. See, e.g., JOINT CONTRACTS
TRIB., CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY MODEL ARBITRATION RULES R. 3, available at
http://www.jctltd.co.uk/assets/JCTCIMAR%2005.pdf (last visited June 24, 2009) (permitting
consolidation of disputes between the same parties even over the objection of a party, but not
permitting the consolidation of related disputes between different parties, absent consent).
281. Swiss RULES, supra note 44, art. 4.
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objections of one or more parties after taking all "relevant and applica-
ble" circumstances into account. 28 ' The Swiss Rules also allow the
inclusion of a third party into the arbitration under similar terms. 23 The
breadth of these provisions suggests that they would likely apply to class
arbitration as well, as a form of consolidated, or third party arbitration.
The Arbitration Rules of the Belgian Center for Arbitration and Me-
diation (CEPANI Rules) also indicate that consolidation of arbitral
proceedings are proper "[w]hen several contracts containing a CEPANI
arbitration clause give rise to disputes that are closely related or indivisi-
ble." 4 The request, which may be made by the arbitrator(s) at any time,
or by one or more of the parties before any other issue is considered, is
referred to the Appointments Committee or chair of the arbitral tribu-
nal.2" The decision is made "after having summoned the parties, and, if
need be, the arbitrators who have already been appointed."286 Again,
these provisions would appear applicable to class arbitration as well.
Consolidation is also liberally permitted by the rules of the Arbitra-
tion Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC Rules),
which hold that the Institute's Board of Directors may, at the request of a
party, consolidate proceedings involving the same parties.287 Although
such a decision will only be made after consulting the parties and the
arbitral tribunal, it too appears to be permitted even over the objection of
one of the parties.2 8 Because this provision only refers to "the same par-
ties," it may not apply to class arbitration. However, as a liberal
provision in favor of multi-party proceedings even over the objection of
the party, it could conceivably be construed to include class arbitration,
particularly if class arbitration were considered to be simply a non-
standard type of bilateral arbitration. 9
The Rules of Arbitration promulgated by the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration (LCIA Rules) give arbitrators the power to
consolidate proceedings "unless the parties at any time agree otherwise
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. CEPANI RULES OF ARBITRATION art. 12, (2005) http://www.cepani.belEN/
default.aspx?PId=369 (last visited July 2, 2009) [hereinafter CEPANI RULES].
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRA-
TION RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
art. 11 (2007) [hereinafter SCC RULES], http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/2/21686/
2007_arbitrationruleseng.pdf (last visited June 30, 2009); see also Kaj Hobr & William
McKechnie, New Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce,
23 ARB. INT'L 261, 263 (2007).
288. See SCC RULES, supra note 286, art. 11; Hobdr & McKechnie, supra note 287, at
263.
289. See supra note 181 (concerning an argument suggested by Frdd~ric Bachand).
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in writing. '290 Again, this provision permits a default position in favor of
group treatment in the event the parties' arbitration agreement is silent or
ambiguous on the issue. Furthermore, the LCIA Rules give arbitrators
"the widest discretion to discharge" their duties, which includes the duty
"to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the arbitration,
avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair and effi-
cient means for the final resolution of the parties' dispute," while also
charging the parties to "do everything necessary for the fair, efficient and
expeditious conduct of the arbitration., 29' Thus, parties to an LCIA arbi-
tration could be subject to a consolidation or a class arbitration order
292
even over the objection of one of the two parties, although commenta-
tors discussing the LCIA Rules have noted that it is possible that such an
award might be subject to an objection based on Article V(1)(d) of the
291New York Convention for violation of the parties' agreement.
The Rules of Arbitration promulgated by the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC Rules) are slightly less far-reaching than the other
294international rules. The ICC Rules do not discuss consolidation per se,
although they do include provisions concerning the naming of arbitrators
in multi-party situations, which is one of the major problems associated
with class and consolidated arbitrations. 9' However, the absence of any
explicit provisions regarding consolidation in the ICC Rules is offset by
the fact that ICC arbitrators have agreed to consolidate proceedings
based on the "group of companies" doctrine.296 This doctrine allows arbi-
trators to join a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement into the
proceedings if the contractual language can be construed as linking the
companies and the parties can be said to have demonstrated an intention
to create an "integrated contractual relationship subject to one single ar-
bitration.' 29 Because the "group of companies" doctrine is based on
implied consent to a multi-party proceeding, as demonstrated through
290. LCIA RULES, supra note 44, R. 22.1.
291. Id. R. 14.1(iii).
292. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 1 16-44.
293. Id. 1 26-66; Pryles, supra note 45, at 339.
294. ICC RULES, supra note 44.
295. Id. art. 10; see infra notes 338-349 and accompanying text.
296. 1 W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRA-
TION 99-100 (2001) (discussing ICC Case 1434, 1976 JDI 978). Nevertheless, joining
additional parties to ICC arbitrations is controversial. See Stephen R. Bond, Multi-Party Arbi-
tration: The Experience of the ICC Court of Arbitration, in 2 W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION app. VI, at 29, 32 (2001) (quoting
1987 ICC case 5625).
297. 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 296, at 99-100. Although the "group of companies"
doctrine arose in ICC arbitrations, it has also been used elsewhere. Stephan Wilske et al., The
"Group of Companies Doctrine "-Where Is it Heading?, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 73, 74
(2006).
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the interpretation of an arbitration agreement that is silent or ambiguous
regarding group proceedings, it would seem that class arbitration could
also be ordered under the ICC Rules.
Finally, Article 15(1) of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules)
permits some flexibility in the structure of the proceedings, even over the
objection of the parties, stating "[s]ubject to these Rules, the arbitral tri-
bunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at
any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of
presenting his case."'298 Thus, it appears that consolidation may be or-
dered under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, even if the parties do not
explicitly agree to such treatment.299 Furthermore, a recent report con-
cerning the possible amendment of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
includes an explicit provision (new Article 15.4) on consolidation.3° The
report suggests that the arbitral tribunal, after consulting with the parties,
can consolidate two or more claims involving only the same parties
when the claims that are subject to separate arbitral proceedings arise out
of common facts. 3 1' Furthermore, consolidation has been promoted in
investment arbitrations that proceed under the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, particularly in situations that resemble class arbitration (i.e.,
where there is only one common party).3 °2 All of this suggests favorable
treatment of class arbitration, since Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Ar-
bitration Rules is drafted broadly enough to apply to class arbitration as
well as consolidated arbitration, and the trend toward increasingly liberal
treatment of consolidated proceedings also supports arguments that class
arbitration should be ordered in appropriate circumstances. 3°3
Overall, the liberalization of international arbitral rules on consolida-
tion supports international acceptance of class arbitration on both a
298. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 44, art. 15(1).
299. Pryles, supra note 45, at 336; see also Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 295-96 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying
objection to enforcement of an award arising out of a consolidated arbitration under Article
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention, based on Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules).
300. JAN PAULSSON & GEORG1OS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE UNCITRAL ARBITRA-
TION RULES 68-70 (2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules-
report.pdf (last visited June 24, 2009).
301. Id.
302. FIONA MARSHALL & HOWARD MANN, GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF
LAW: EXPRESS RULES FOR INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATIONS REQUIRED 10 (2006), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/investment-uncitral-rules-rrevision.pdf (last visited June 24,
2009) (claiming that "[t]he fact that claims may have only one common party and lack a
common legal relationship should not bar consolidation").
303. UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 44, art. 15(1).
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practical and theoretical level. In the past, consolidation of international
arbitration was discouraged because there was confusion about (1) who,
if anyone, had the power to compel consolidation, and (2) what proce-
dures would be followed in the consolidated proceedings, particularly
regarding the nomination of arbitrators. These pragmatic concerns have
been extended to class arbitration as well. However, the international
arbitral community is not only developing appropriate procedures for
handling multi-party and multi-contract arbitration, but an increasing
number of rules are also specifically sanctioning the consolidation of
arbitrations in appropriate situations, even over the objection of the par-
ties. As a practical matter, this eliminates questions about who, if
anyone, has the power to order multi-party arbitrations and what proce-
dures are to be followed in such proceedings.
Thus, many of the leading general arbitral rules suggest that class
arbitrations should be entitled to the same sorts of presumptions at the
enforcement stage as are accorded to bilateral arbitrations. Not only is
the international arbitral community developing a recognition that multi-
party proceedings are becoming increasingly common, it is creating the
necessary support mechanisms for arbitrators to deal with novel arbitral
procedures. Thus, the expansion of class arbitration into the international
realm is consistent with what is happening in other areas of international
arbitral law and practice.
IV. ENFORCING U.S.-BASED CLASS ARBITRATIONS
UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
This Article takes the view that class awards issued out of the United
States should receive the same presumption of international enforcement
that is afforded to other awards under the New York Convention and na-
tional law, even in cases where the arbitration agreement is silent or
ambiguous as to class treatment.3° Nevertheless, certain objections under
Article V of the New York Convention are likely to be lodged against
such awards at the time of enforcement, and the viability of such objec-
tions must be considered .
Before beginning this discussion, it is important to make clear that
this Article does not argue that individualized objections to class awards
304. See BORN, supra note 15, at 5 (discussing the presumption of enforceability under
the New York Convention and national laws).
305. Article V constitutes the exclusive means of challenging the enforcement of an
award under the New York Convention. Troy L. Harris, The "Public Policy" Exception to
Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards Under the New York Convention: With Par-
ticular Reference to Construction Disputes, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 9, 10 (2007).
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are never proper. Instead, the issue is whether blanket objections to class
awards-based solely on the novelty of the procedure and the arbitra-
tor's power or ability to construe silent or ambiguous arbitration
agreements to permit class treatment-should be recognized.
As previously noted, objections to class arbitration can take several
different forms.3°6 However, this Article focuses on objections based on
alleged violations of party autonomy, including party agreements and
expectations regarding
(1) the length, complexity, and type of proceedings;3 °7
(2) third party strangers to the contract becoming involved in
confidential proceedings;3 8 and
(3) the process of selecting arbitrators. °
Objections of these kinds fall most naturally under Article V(1)(d) of
the New York Convention, which deals with "lt]he composition of the
arbitral authority" and "arbitral procedure [that] was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place."30 Traditionally, objections to enforcement are to be construed
narrowly, since the New York Convention presumes that, for the most
part, foreign awards are to be recognized and enforced. 3 ' Only in ex-
treme cases are courts permitted to interfere with the arbitral process by
refusing enforcement after the arbitration's conclusion on the merits.3 2
Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention has not yet been in-
voked with respect to class arbitration. However, as the following
discussion indicates, there is nothing about international class arbitration
that would permit a standing objection to a class award to prevail under
this provision. Each of the three types of objections will be taken in turn.
306. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
307. FRICK, supra note 95, at 230-31; Chiu, supra note 91, at 55-56; Leboulanger, supra
note 91, at 62-63.
308. Mistelis, supra note 144, at 212; Tweeddale, supra note 144, at 59-60.
309. Chiu, supra note 91, at 55-56; Leboulanger, supra note 91, at 63; Rau & Sherman,
supra note 91, at 109-11; Schwartz, supra note 94, at 342-43.
310. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d). Since this Article focuses on
class arbitrations seated in the United States and class arbitration is a recognized dispute reso-
lution process under U.S. law, the assumption herein is that the arbitral procedure was "in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place," which means that the
discussion will concentrate on issues relating to the parties' agreement. Id.
311. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 126-66; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 12,
U 10-33 to 10-34 (noting the objections to enforcement under the New York Convention are
exhaustive and must be construed restrictively); Park & Yanos, supra note 14, at 254, 259.
312. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 26-65 to 26-70.
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A. Arbitral Procedure
The first and most likely objection to class awards will challenge the
form of the proceedings under Article V(1)(d) of the New York Conven-
tion, with the primary focus on whether the procedure chosen by the
arbitrator was in accordance with the arbitration agreement.3 3 To date,
no blanket objections to the method of interpreting arbitration agree-
ments under U.S. law have ever been lodged in enforcement procedures
regarding bilateral arbitrations, so arbitrators who rely on U.S. law to
construe an arbitration agreement that is silent or ambiguous as to class
treatment should, as a matter of procedure, feel confident about render-
ing an internationally enforceable award. Furthermore, the interpretive
method used by U.S. arbitrators in deciding whether an arbitration
agreement would permit class arbitration has been shown to be consis-tent it inernaionl •314
tent with international practice, thus providing additional reasons why
a general objection to class procedure should not prevail.
If, however, arbitrators expressly invoke the notion of implied con-
sent without also drawing attention to the interpretive method used, the
resulting awards may be on shakier ground, since the international arbi-
tral community appears to be split on the propriety of implied consent to
multi-party proceedings. On the one hand, Gary Born states that "[i]f
consolidation is based on the parties' implied consent, then Article
V(1)(d) would presumably not be offended."3 ' Born continues, stating
"[s]ome commentators have gone further and suggested that agreement
on a curial law that permits mandatory consolidation constitutes en-
forceable acceptance of such consolidation for purposes of Article
V(1)(d). 3 6 Born's view seems correct, particularly given the recent lib-
eralization of legislation and arbitral rules on consolidation, and can be
extended to address class arbitration as well. His approach is also consis-
tent with other aspects of international arbitration law, including the use
of implied consent to bring non-signatories to an arbitration agreement
into arbitral proceedings.3 7
On the other hand, Julian Lew has said that "[i]t is doubtful whether
an award arising out of consolidated arbitration proceedings would be
enforceable under the New York Convention," even in cases where the
relevant law or arbitral rules give the necessary authority to a court,
313. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d).
314. See supra notes 186-216 and accompanying text.
315. BORN, supra note 15, at 695.
316. Id. (citing Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter as authority).
317. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(noting five methods of binding non-signatories to an arbitration agreement, several of which
constitute the functional equivalent of implied consent).
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arbitrator, or appointing authority.3 8 Lew's position appears to be based
on a strict reading of party autonomy, and again it would seem that his
views would extend to class arbitration as well.3'9 However, for the rea-
sons stated above, a strict constructionist approach to class arbitration
appears contrary to established international law and policy.
30
Although Born and Lew were discussing the enforcement of con-
solidated arbitration rather than class arbitration, this split of opinion
suggests that class awards will receive a similarly divided response at the
international enforcement stage. It will be interesting to see whether in-
ternational class awards receive differential treatment depending on
whether the arbitrator explicitly relies on a doctrine of implied consent
in finding the parties amenable to class arbitration versus an explicit reli-
ance on established rules of contract construction. Of course, the
difference is more a matter of semantics than content, since implied con-
sent is at the core of the interpretive method used by both U.S. and
international arbitrators. Because that methodology is consistent with
established arbitral practice, it therefore justifies class awards being
given the same presumption of enforceability that is given to bilateral
awards. Furthermore, a detailed discussion of the two most important
procedural objections shows why a liberal approach to the international
enforcement of class awards is defensible under international law and
practice. That discussion is contained in the following two subsections.
B. Confidentiality
As indicated previously, proponents of international arbitration have
long touted its ability to keep proceedings private and confidential.12'
Indeed, the presumed protections of privacy and confidentiality were
sometimes used to challenge consolidation proceedings, as seen in the
English case of Oxford Shipping Co. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha (The East-
ern Saga), which forbade non-consensual consolidation due, at least in
part, to concerns about confidentiality and the assumption that additional
parties would be strangers to the proceedings.3 22 However, as oft-cited as
318. LEW ET AL., supra note 44, 16-96 to 16-97; REDFERN& HUNTER, supra note 12,
10-42.
319. See LEW ET AL., supra note 44, I 16-97 to 16-98.
320. See supra notes 117-163 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
322. Oxford Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nippon Yusen Kaisha (The Eastern Saga), [1984] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 373 (Eng.); Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceed-
ings, II ARB. INT'L 321, 324 (1995). In his opinion, Mr. Justice Leggatt stated:
It seems to me that ... arbitrators enjoy no power to order concurrent hearings, or
anything of that nature, without the consent of the parties. The concept of private
arbitration derives simply from the fact that the parties have agreed to submit to ar-
bitration particular disputes arising between them and only between them. It is
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The Eastern Saga may be in the literature, its holdings may no longer be
binding or even persuasive for several reasons, even in its home jurisdic-
tion.323
First, the presumption of privacy and/or confidentiality in arbitration
is waning in international circles, particularly in situations where there
may be a public interest in disclosure.324 This is particularly important for
class arbitration, since public interest exists in both the outcome325 and
the process itself."6 The AAA has taken this increased level of public
interest into account in its class arbitration rules, which explicitly deviate
from any presumptions of privacy and confidentiality by permitting all
class members (and/or their counsel) to attend all hearings and by requir-
ing certain pleadings to be published on the AAA's website for public
327
viewing.
Second, class arbitrations typically do not contain the kind of
"competitively sensitive information" that can create problems for some
consolidated arbitrations . Sensitive trade issues can arise in consoli-
dated cases when claimants attempt to join market competitors as
co-defendants, despite the fact that the proceedings may require the dis-
closure of competitive information.329 The situation is not as likely to
arise in class arbitration, which typically involves a claimant group with
implicit in this that strangers shall be excluded from the hearing and conduct of the
arbitration and that neither the tribunal nor any of the parties can insist that the dis-
pute shall be heard or determined concurrently with or even in consonance with
another dispute, however convenient that course may be to the party seeking it and
however closely associated with each other the disputes in question may be. The
only powers which an arbitrator enjoys relate to the reference in which he has been
appointed. They cannot be extended merely because a similar dispute exists which
is capable of being and is referred separately to arbitration under a different agree-
ment.
The Eastern Saga, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 379.
323. In 2008, the English Court of Appeal may have reversed the presumption of privacy
in arbitration. Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 184 (Eng.)
(concerning international arbitration).
324. See supra note 144 (regarding confidentiality and public interest); see also Emmott,
[2008] E.W.C.A. Civ. at 184 (concerning international arbitration). Furthermore, there is al-
ways a public interest in proper adjudication of private disputes, even in arbitration. Park,
Arbitrability Dicta, supra note 43, at 138-40.
325. For example, large awards can affect stock prices of publicly offered companies.
Similarly, certain types of injunctive relief can require defendants to alter their operating pro-
cedures going forward. Both types of awards can affect people other than the claimants
themselves.
326. For example, some members of the public may wish to join the class or opt out of
it. Members of the public may also wish to bring related claims in the same or other proceed-
ings.
327. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 9.
328. McLaughlin et al., supra note 195, n.56.
329. Id. nn.56-85 (describing the first case brought under the North American Free
Trade Agreement's consolidation provision).
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identical or nearly-identical interests. Thus, concerns about disclosures
to strangers to the arbitration are diminished in class proceedings.
Third, many so-called strangers to the proceeding are quite probably
not complete outsiders.3 Instead, a purported stranger may be one of the
original signatories, albeit "in a different guise," as would occur if the
signatory had been acquired by another company, or an otherwise related
party.33' The stranger may even be an arbitrator who has been found ac-
ceptable for one proceeding between the parties but is considered
objectionable for another related or unrelated arbitration.332 However,
there seems to be few reasons-other than strict constructionism-to
disallow strangers of this type to participate in class proceedings. In-
stead, arbitrators can rely on the principle of effective interpretation in
instances where the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to
multi-party proceedings, allowing a slight deviation from legitimate (or
possibly illegitimate) expectations regarding privacy and confidentiality
so that the parties' broader goal of arbitrating (rather than litigating) the
dispute can be fulfilled.
Aside from cases such as The Eastern Saga, protection for arbitral
confidentiality is actually quite minimal. 33 For example, violation of the
principles of privacy and/or confidentiality does not constitute an inde-
pendent ground for objection under the New York Convention. Instead,
privacy and confidentiality are only protected under the New York Con-
vention to the extent such requirements are reflected in the parties'
arbitration agreement. National laws on arbitration are also not helpful
when trying to discern the extent to which privacy and confidentiality
should be respected.3 For example, parties to arbitrations seated in the
United States cannot rely on federal law to protect them, since the FAA
does not address arbitral confidentiality and no such requirement has
been imposed by U.S. federal courts. 35 For these reasons, commentators
have advised parties in the United States and elsewhere to provide ex-
plicitly for confidentiality in their arbitration agreements if they want to
keep proceedings out of the public eye.336
330. Rau, supra note 43, at 227.
331. Id.
332. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 459 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dis-
senting) (claiming Green Tree had a right to a different arbitrator in every proceeding); see
also The Eastern Saga, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 373, 379 (Leggatt, J.).
333. The Eastern Saga, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 373.
334. See, e.g., loanna Thoma, Confidentiality in English Arbitration Law: Myths and
Realities About its Legal Nature, 25 J. INT'L ARB. 299 passim (2008) (discussing the basis of
the principle of confidentiality under English law).
335. See Robert W. DiUbaldo, Evolving Issues in Reinsurance Disputes: The Power of
Arbitrators, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 102 (2008).
336. Id.
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Given the shift toward increased transparency in bilateral arbitration,
particularly in cases involving matters of public interest,337 it would be
difficult to oppose class arbitration simply on the claim that the proce-
dure violates principles of privacy or confidentiality. Of course, if the
arbitration agreement includes a confidentiality provision that would
seem to cover class arbitration, the arbitrator should take that provision
into account lest the award be deemed unenforceable under Article
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention.38 However, confidentiality provi-
sions should not be broadly construed, particularly when the agreement
as a whole is determinqd to be silent or ambiguous regarding class
treatment, since there is (1) no consensus on the parameters of privacy or
confidentiality in arbitration and (2) no policy reasons why class arbitra-
tion should be deemed to violate any principles of privacy or
confidentiality that do exist.
3 39
C. Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal
One of the most problematic aspects of consolidated arbitration in-
volves the composition of the arbitral tribunal. Selection procedures in
bilateral arbitration tend to be rather straightforward affairs wherein the
parties typically designate an appointing authority or set up a procedure
by which the parties themselves choose the arbitrator(s). In situations
where a three-personal panel is needed, parties often agree to each select
an arbitrator, with the chairperson to be chosen by the two party-
appointed arbitrators.
Courts vigorously protect the right of the parties to choose their own
arbitrators, often under the rubric of "the equality of the parties," which
is considered a "fundamental right" in arbitration. The ability to name
one's own arbitrator is often considered a sufficient safeguard of a
party's procedural rights. Thus, agreements concerning the composition
337. See supra note 144.
338. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(l)(d).
339. This is particularly true if the parties proceed under the AAA Supplementary Rules,
since those rules explicitly waive certain aspects of arbitral confidentiality. AAA SUPPLEMEN-
TARY RULES, supra note 30, R. 9. However, an arbitrator may derogate from the AAA
Supplementary Rules' presumption against privacy and confidentiality in appropriate circum-
stances and provide for increased confidentiality. Id. R. 9(a).
340. B.K.M.I. Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Dutco Constr. Co. Ltd., XV Y.B. COM. ARB.
124 (1990); GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, $ 792-93; Nicklisch, supra note 92, at 63.
Although commentators have noted that Dutco is limited in many ways to its facts, the deci-
sion resulted in the revision of several arbitral rules to address the problem of multi-party
arbitration. Hanotiau, Problems, supra note 91, at 340-43. Many rules now avoid the Dutco
problem by appointing the entire tribunal, which means that all parties are treated equally.
Platte, supra note 93, at 75; see also YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE
NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 165-73 (1998) (regarding revisions to ICC Arbitration
Rules).
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of the arbitral tribunal are explicitly protected under Article V(1)(d) of
the New York Convention. 34'
Because the appointment procedure reflected in many arbitration
agreements typically contemplates bilateral arbitration, logistical and
jurisprudential problems arise when it turns out that the dispute requires
the participation of more than two parties.342 This is true even though the
parties to a class arbitration typically know that the arbitration will pro-
ceed as such from the very beginning, as compared to consolidated
arbitrations, where the possibility of multi-party treatment may not arise
until after the arbitrators are named.3 3 In both cases, there are problems
if each individual party asserts its right to name an arbitrator, since the
size of the panel quickly becomes unmanageable.
Numerous solutions have been proposed over the years,344 but the
most common approach now is that the appointing authority names the
entire panel, either immediately or once it is clear that the parties cannot
agree among themselves as to whom to name. 4 ' This method, which is
341. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(1)(d).
342. FRICK, supra note 95, at 233-35; Cate, supra note 213, at 143; Chiu, supra note 91,
at 58-59.
343. Though additional unnamed class claimants may be added during the process, the
named claimants typically include a request for class treatment in their request for relief,
whether that request is initially submitted in the courts (and later referred to arbitration) or in
arbitration. If the parties are aligned in such a way that they can be readily broken into oppos-
ing "sides" and are all present at the time that the arbitrator is named, then the right to name
one's own arbitrator may be said to have been respected. Even if some unnamed class mem-
bers join after the arbitrator has been named, they can be deemed to have waived the right to
name an individual arbitrator if they decide not to opt out of the class. The situation is not the
same in consolidated and other sorts of multi-party arbitrations, since the parties may not align
themselves into "sides" so easily. See supra notes 327-328 and accompanying text. Parties to
consolidated arbitrations may not opt out of the proceedings either.
344. For example, each of the parties might appoint its own arbitrator, with additional
neutrals being added to act as chairs. Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Ship-
ping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), partially overruled on other grounds, United
Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring three party-appointed arbitra-
tors and two additional neutrals); FRICK, supra note 95, at 234. This system reflects an attempt
to respect the right of a party to name its own arbitrator, although "the size of the panel cannot
be increased indefinitely." Chiu, supra note 91, at 60. Furthermore, this approach has been
criticized on the grounds that "it would result in unequal positions of the parties since a single
party can appoint only one arbitrator," although a potentially acceptable alternative would be
"give a single party the right to appoint the same number of arbitrators as the other, multiple
parties." FRICK, supra note 95, at 234; see also Nicklisch, supra note 92, at 61 (criticizing the
procedure). However, the effect of this second alternative would be virtually the same as
grouping claimants and respondents (no matter their number) into teams for the purpose of
selecting an arbitrator.
345. CEPANI RULES, supra note 284, art. 9(3); LCIA RULES, supra note 44, rule 8; ICC
RULES, supra note 44, art. 10; SCC RULES, supra note 286, art. 13(4); Swiss RULES, supra
note 44, art. 8(5); see FRICK, supra note 95, at 234 (claiming arbitral institutions should ap-
point arbitrators for all parties if a conflict of interest might arise between groups of claimants
or defendants); Hober & McKechnie, supra note 287, at 263-64; Platte, supra note 93, nn.7 I-
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considered to protect the equality of the parties, would apply equally
well in class arbitrations, both conceptually and under the language of
many arbitral rules themselves, which typically refer to "multi-party
proceedings," thus ostensibly embracing class proceedings.346 Of course,
parties may only rely on the appointment provisions contained in an in-
stitutional rule set if they have agreed to the application of those rules.
As is always the case in arbitration, much depends on the precise
language of the arbitration agreement. Experience shows that strict con-
structionists will parse the relevant language very carefully. 7 Not
everyone takes such a literal approach, however, and courts have been
known to construe appointment provisions broadly, perhaps based on the
notion that a party can waive its right to appoint an arbitrator;348 that no
material injury was suffered in the instant case; 349 or that arbitration im-
poses a duty on the parties to cooperate in good faith in the performance
of the arbitration agreement and that slight adjustments to the selection
scheme should be permitted.3 50 It may also be that the principle of effec-
tive interpretation plays a role.5 Whatever the underlying rationale,
however, the mechanisms are in place to permit class arbitration to over-
come the problems associated with the naming of arbitrators.
75; Whitesell & Silva-Romero, supra note 6, at 12 (noting the ICC mechanism is used conser-
vatively).
346. CEPANI RULES, supra note 284, art. 9(3); ICC RULES, supra note 44, art. 10; LCIA
RULES, supra note 44, R. 8; Swiss RULES, supra note 44, art. 8(5); SCC RULES, supra note
286, art. 13(4).
347. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 539 (2003) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (stating "petitioner had the contractual right to choose an arbitrator for each
dispute with the other 3,734 individual class members, and this right was denied when the
same arbitrator was foisted upon petitioner to resolve those claims as well"). The plurality in
Bazzle held instead that "[t]he class arbitrator was 'selected by' Green Tree 'with consent of'
Green Tree's customers, the named plaintiffs. And insofar as the other class members agreed
to proceed in class arbitration, they consented as well." Id. at 451 (Breyer, J.).
348. FRICK, supra note 95, at 235.
349. See, e.g., China Nanhai Oil Joint Serv. Corp. v. Gee Tai Holdings Co. Ltd., XX YB.
Com. ARB. 671 (H.K. Sup. Ct. 1995) (Hong Kong Supreme Court noting that "technically the
arbitrators did not have jurisdiction to decide this dispute" because of an error in the constitu-
tion of the tribunal but refusing to deny enforcement nonetheless because the defendants'
rights were not "violated in any material way").
350. Hanotiau, Problems, supra note 91, at 304 (noting the refusal to designate the same
arbitrator in parallel arbitral panels might be considered to be in breach of the duty to cooper-
ate); Leboulanger, supra note 91, at 91-92.
351. GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 44, 478.
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CONCLUSION
In the twenty-five-plus years since its first appearance in California
state courts,352 class arbitration has matured into a sophisticated dispute
resolution mechanism. Not only have several world-class arbitral institu-
tions promulgated specialized arbitral rules to help standardize class
procedures, but courts in a variety of civil and common law jurisdictions
have recognized the propriety of class arbitrations in appropriate circum-
stances.
Despite these advancements, class arbitration has developed primar-
ily as a domestic phenomenon, insulated by the policy values and legal
principles of the different States in which it has appeared. Only recently
have class disputes moved to the international sphere. However, the ex-
pansion of class arbitration beyond national borders requires courts and
commentators to take a hard look at the procedure used to ensure that it
has developed in conformity with international arbitral law and policy.
Class arbitration's failure to meet international standards could open a
class award up to a variety of objections under cross-border enforcement
instruments such as the New York Convention.3 3
This Article has focused on procedural objections that will likely
arise as a result of the decision to permit a class arbitration to proceed
when the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous regarding class
treatment. Because it is anticipated that most international class arbitra-
tions will be seated in the United States or proceed under U.S. law, at
least for the foreseeable future, the analysis has focused on U.S. law and
practice to evaluate the extent to which the interpretive methods used in
the United States conform to international law and practice.
As it turns out, U.S. methods of construing arbitration agreements
are in accord with international norms. First, arbitrators based in the
United States use an interpretive method that seeks to identify whether
the parties can be said to have impliedly consented to this particular type
of arbitral proceeding. Although implied consent is used in other aspects
of international arbitration, some of which are not analogous to the type
of implied consent used here, the emphasis on party intent and expecta-
tions is completely appropriate in a dispute resolution mechanism that is
founded on party autonomy and consent.
Second, the interpretive methodology used by arbitrators based in
the United States is consistent with that used by arbitrators based else-
where, particularly with respect to the approach used in the construction
352. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
353. New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V(l)(d).
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of pathological clauses. For example, arbitrators seeking to discover
whether an arbitration agreement will support class arbitration look first
to the language of the arbitration agreement itself, possibly also taking
into account extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent and expectations.
Arbitrators also look to any national laws or arbitral rules that can be
said to apply in case those laws or rules provide any indication of what
procedures are to be followed in cases of contractual silence or ambigu-
ity, or when there is a conflict between the procedural posture that was
presumed by the parties ex ante (i.e., bilateral arbitration) and the actual
procedural posture that has in fact arisen (i.e., multilateral arbitration).
Although each arbitration agreement must be construed under its own
unique terms and circumstances, the preceding analysis has demon-
strated that the method of analysis is entirely appropriate. Furthermore,
to the extent that arbitrators in the United States who are undertaking
this inquiry permit slight deviations from the letter of the parties' agree-
ment in order to give effect to the parties' explicit and presumably
overriding intent to arbitrate their disputes, that technique is entirely
proper. Commentators in the United States and elsewhere have long rec-
ognized that de minimis alterations to the arbitration agreement will not
support objections to enforcement under the New York Convention.354
Although arbitrators in the United States do not use the internationally
recognized term "principle of effective interpretation" when applying
this technique-preferring, instead, to point to the pro-arbitration policy
underlying the FAA and state statutes on arbitration-the intent, method,
355
and outcome are the same.
Third, the internationalization of class arbitration is consistent with
global trends toward the facilitation of multi-party arbitration. Most of
the changes to both laws and arbitral rules have been inspired by the
need and desire to consolidate arbitrations in situations where the arbi-
tration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to consolidation. However,
increased acceptance of multi-party arbitration in the absence of explicit
choice benefits class arbitration as well as consolidated arbitration, since
it demonstrates a policy shift away from strict construction of arbitration
agreements. Furthermore, arbitrators who are asked to construe arbitra-
tion agreements in the class context can often rely explicitly on statutes
and rules regarding consolidated arbitration to permit a ruling in favor of
class arbitration, since statutes and rules on multi-party arbitration are
often drafted broadly enough to embrace questions regarding class arbi-
tration.
354. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Although the legal analysis is sufficient to demonstrate the interna-
tional enforceability of class awards, there are also numerous policy
reasons to support such an outcome. First, class arbitrations carry nu-
merous public benefits that do not exist in other types of arbitration. The
unique nature of class claims often requires class treatment, either in
arbitration or in litigation, if the claimants are to exercise their rights
fully. If the parties have demonstrated an intent to arbitrate disputes of
this type, then class proceedings may very well be proper, even if the
parties have not specifically contemplated class arbitration. Second, class
arbitrations are not so analogous to consolidated arbitrations on either a
legal or policy level such that class arbitrations should be subject to any
antipathy that might be shown to consolidated arbitration. Instead, class
arbitration's unique policy considerations result in the view that strict
construction of the arbitration agreement is inappropriate. Instead, the
better approach, as a matter of public policy, is to allow arbitrators to use
established methods of interpretation to see whether implied consent to
this particular type of proceeding exists. While public policy will not
overcome the parties' express wishes, the better default position in cases
where there is silence or ambiguity is to allow the arbitrator to construe
the contract in accordance with traditional legal principles.
When looked at in this light, class arbitration-and the decision that
an arbitration agreement that is silent or ambiguous as to multi-party
proceedings can support class arbitration--does not seem unduly prob-
lematic. However, the novelty of the procedure and the disfavor with
which representative proceedings are held in many nations will doubtless
lead to challenges at the international enforcement stage. Nevertheless,
blanket objections to class awards based on the arbitrator's choice of this
particular procedure in cases where the arbitration agreement is silent or
ambiguous appear ungrounded. Instead, awards arising out of interna-
tional class arbitration should be given the same presumption of
enforceability that is granted to awards arising out of bilateral arbitra-
tions under the New York Convention and national laws.56 That
presumption can be overcome by an individualized showing of impropri-
ety, but not by any claim in which the procedure or interpretive
methodology used by the arbitrator is suspect. Instead, as a matter of
international law and policy, class arbitrations should be considered pre-
sumptively proper and class awards presumptively enforceable, even in
situations where the arbitration agreement is silent or ambiguous as to
class treatment.
356. BORN, supra note 15, at 5.
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